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G VEIL PIERCING FOR ALL LIMITED
IIJABIUTY ENTITIES: FORCING
~ COMMON LAW
DOCTRINE INTO THE STATUTORY AGE
REV

Rebecca]. Huss •
This is an exciting time in business, organizational law. The·availability of new types of limited liability e11tities (LLEs) provides an opportunity to re-evaluate doctrines that ha,ve become entrenched in common
law.t In every
state,
legislatures
have
created
new
and
more
flexible
.
entities in which to hold assets. The two "new" entity forms that have
been universally adopted are the lirnited liability company (LLC) and
2
limited liability partnership (LLP). Now that the provisions of these
LLE statutes are beginning to settle into some semblance of stability, it
is time to consider the application ofcommon law "corporate" doctrines
3
to these entities.
Although there is evidence that allowing individuals to be shielded
from personal liability for entity debts is a net benefit to society; there
are costs generated by this system. ~ One of these costs is that some
creditors will not be paid if the entity has insufficient assets. The limited
liability system assigns the risk of tltis nonpayment to these creditors.
Under certain circumstances, courts have created exceptions to the
general limited liability rule to redress unfairness in this risk allocation
system. One common law doctrine that has developed to eliminate the
4

• Assistant Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law; LL.M. University of Iowa, 1995; J.D.
University of Richmond, 1992. The author wishes to thank Peter Huang and john D. Mandelbaum for their
comments. This paper also ben~fited from the comme:ntsofLaura Dooley, Alex Geisinger, Linda Whitton,
and the other participants of the Valparaiso University faculty colloquium. Special thanks to the Col. Erwin
A. jones Faculty Development. Endowment and Erwir1 A.Jones,Jr. for funding this project.
I. I .I.E in this paper refers to LLCs and I.I.Ps. Corporations are treated outside the definition of
an LLE although they dearly are entities with limited liability protection.
"New" entity is a somewhat broad way to describe 1J .Ps as they are simply general partnerships
that have elected to take advantage of certain limited liability protections provided for by I ..LP provisions.
Su infra text accompanying note I2 (description of the l.LP entity). Some states have also adopted provisions
allowing the general partners of limited p~rtnerships to take advantage of a limited liability shield. These
entities are referred to as "limited liability limited partnerships•' or LLLPs. Su in.fra text accompanying notes
13-20 (discussion of LPs and LI.I,Ps).
3. During the early y·ears after LLC statutes were adopted, the amendment of the statutes was a
regular occurrence. Since the amendments that occurred after the "check the box" regulations were
implemented, providing more certainty as ~o the tax treatment of LLCs, states have continued to amend
LLC provisions but with fewer wholesale changes. See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
4. Professor Thompson states that "the continued judicial preference for limited liability in
corporate groups ... may reflect a society-wide judgment that the benefits of limited liability exceed its
costs." Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking limiJed 1~: Direct and V~emious li4bi.Ji!y ofCorporau Participanlsfor
Torts oftire Enlerprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. I, 23 (1994). Su in.fra text accompanying notes 37-76 (discussion of
li111itecl lial>ilit)f).
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limited liability shield is referred to as "piercing the corporate veil" ·
(hereinafter referred to as piercing the veil or veil piercing). Unfortunately, the veil piercing doctrine is not consistently applied by the
5
courts. Interest holders and creditors alike are unable to determine the
circumstances in which the theory can be applied successfully because
of the differences in standards used by the courts:. The veil piercing
theory as it has been applied is so seriously flawed that the time has
come to reconsider the use of the common law concept at all. It is time
for the adoption of a cohe.re.nt method to deal with the perceived unfairness in risk allocation for all entities with limited liability protection.
This paper proposes that legislatures adopt a statutory provision
codifying the best ~spects of the veil piercing doctrine in order to
provide courts with a framework to apply the doctrine consistendy.
Along with a new statutory framework, the increa~ed use of existing
fraudulent transfer provisions and the implementation ofother statutory
reforms is recommended to provide creditors with a remedy in
•
•
appropnate c1rcumsta~ces.
To provide support for the implementation and increased use of
statutory provisions, this paper begins with a brief history and description of the new IJ . Es and discusses some of the basic theories supporting
limited liability. A general overview of the veil piercing doctrine and its.
6
likely application to these new entities follows. Finally, this paper
argues that the time is ripe to explore and implement ideas for accomplishing the goals of veil piercing in a more consistent manner .
•

I. NEW LIMITED LIABIUTY ENTI'fiES

A. History ofNew Limited Liabili~ Entities
The LLC is an entity form that combines the management flexibility
and tax advantages of the partnership structure with limited liability
protection for interest holders similar to the protection provided to
shareholders ofcotporations. Unlike the corporate structure, which has

existed in the United States since before the U.S. was a sovereign

5. Professor Blumberg states that piercing the corporate veil "fails to provide a workable framework
for analysis, but it still largely prevails,,. PHIWPI. BLUMBERG, THEJ..AWOFCORPORATEGROUPS, TORT,
CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN TiiE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND

SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, at xxxvi (1987 &. Supp. 2000).

6. As few courts have decided cases concerning the application of the doctrine to I .I .Es, one must
look to statutory language and make analogies to issues raised in corporate cases to deternaine what factors
a court is likely to consider.

•
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nation, LLCs are a recent phenomenon. The first U.S. LLC statute
was passed in 1977 by the state of Wyoming,. although similar entity
8
forms have been available and are relatively common outside the U.S.
The uncertain tax status of LLCs hampered the adoption of LLC
9
statutes· in the 1·980s and early 1990s. Mter almost a decade of
interaction between private p,arties interested in LLCs ,a nd the IRS, on
January l, 1997, the IRS implemented "check the box" rules that allow
any business entity that is not requirc!d to b,e treated as a corporation fo,r
federal _tax purposes to essentially choose the manner in which it will be
10
taxed. Even prior to the check the box rules, however, the growth in

7. Su Susan Pace Hamill, 1M Origins Bekind lhllimiled Liabili!)l Compa19, 59 OHIO ST~ LJ. I 459, 1485
(1998).

•

8. Sel UJ. at 1460. Pro(essor Hamill's article describes in detail the story behind the Wyoming LLC
statute and the development of the LLC as a popular choice of business entity. Su gmeral!1. id. .Florida was
the second state to enact an lLC statute in 1982. Jd. at 1469. Entities similar to LLCs have been available
in other countries for a long period of time. Debra Cohen·Whelan, Individual &s.
· .· · in llt8 W~ of
limiltd Liabilig, 32· U.S.F. L. Rtv. 335, 338 (1998). Sa also Steven C. Bahls, AppliclllUm of Corpora~~ Common
law Doctrines kJ Limiled liohili~ Companils, 55 MONT. L. REV. 43, 46 ( 1994); Shaun M. Klein, Piercing lite Jltil
ofllll limiltd /Mhili!Y Company,fo;m Suu &lto long SlwL· Gallinger v. North Star Hospital Mutual Assuranc~,
Ltd., 22 IOWA J. CORP. L. 131, 131 n.l ( 1996). Sd also generally WiUiamJ. Carney, Limiled Liabili!Y Companw:
Origins andAnl«edmts, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 855 (1995). The Wyoming statute was specifically forrnulated
to try to secure partnership classification status for federal tax purposes for a U.S. unincorporated entity.
Hamill, supra note 7, at 1466. The first LLC forrncd under the Wyoming LLC statute was ultimately
successful in obtaining a private letter ruling allowing for pannership classification. Jd. at 1467. See also Dale
A. Oesterle, Subcrmenls in UC StaJuJes: LimiJin& 1M Diserehtm ofSiok. Courts llJ Restrueture 1M Intmud Affairs ofSmll!J
Bwin.us. 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 881 (1995)~ Although corporations electing Subchapter Shave similar
tax characteristics, there are difFerences in the taxtreaun.e nt ofS corporations and partnerships. In addition,
although restrictions relating to Subchapter S corporation shareholders have been loosened, there is more
flexibility in the LLC ownership structure. Set I'M'ai!Y Scott Kapusta and Brian Nichols, Limited Liabilig
· •. 1714 OplimtJJBwVws Organitalj.onj01the T~-First Cenlury?, 9ST.jOHN'Sj.LEGALCOMMENT. 803
(1994)~

•

9. Between 1980 and 1988, the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) position relating to the tax
classification of LLCs remained unclear leaving the fc:deral tax status of LLCs in limbo during that time.
Hamill, supra note 7, at 1468-69. Due to ,this uncertain tax status, there was limited use and slow
development of LLC statutes during the 1980s. Jd. at 1469. Then, on September 2, J988, the IRS issued
a Revenue Ruling that pernlitted a Wyoming LLC to be classified as a partnership based on its application
of a specified set of factors relating to the entity•s "non-c:orporate" status. Rev. Rut 88·76t 1988-2 C.B. 360.
Thus, the IRS would apply a set of factors to classify each LLC for tax purposes, including (I) limited
liability, (2) continuity oflife, (3) free transferability ofownership, (4) centralized management, (5) association
of members and (6) entity formed to carry on business. William H. Copperthwaite, Jr., Limited Liabili9
Companw: 1M Clwitefqr the Futur,, 103 COM. L.J. 222, 224 (1998). In order to make certain that the IRS
would treat an entity as a partnership, the a(tomey involved in the process had to make certain that each
LLC lacked at a minimum two of the first four characteristics. Much of the·commentary on LLCs prior to
1997 discussed i'ssues relating to these corporate attributes. After the 1988 Revenue RulingJ :several states
passed LLC statUtes, although the usc of LLCs was complicated by the individual application of the IRS'
factors to deterrnine pannership tax treatment.
•
10. Treas. Reg.§ 301.7701-1 (1997) et seq. (WgSTLAW throughjanuary J, 2001). &eal.ro Hamill,
supra note 7, at 1474-83 {describing the interaction of the IRS with interested parties, including committees
of the American Bar Association). Note that under Internal Revenue Code§ 7704, certain publicly held
partnerships will be treated as corporations for tax pua·poses~ 26 U.s~c § 7704 (200 I) (West; WESTLAW
'
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LLC filings can. only be viewed as tremendous, and it is likely that the
11

trend will be that increasing num·bers of·LLCs will be for1ned.
An LLP is a general partnership that has elected to take advantage of
a limited liability protection provision. The history of LLPs is shorter
than that of LLCs, with the fi~st statute providing for LLPs enacted in

•

Texas in 1991.

12

Unlike the LLC provisions that stand as separate

sections of a state's code, provisions providing for LLPs are

g~nerally

added to a state's existing partnership act.
It is important to briefly discuss limited liability limited partnerships
(LLLPs)~ Historically, limited partnership (LP) statutes provided that at
least one partner (the general partner) would be subject to unlimited
13

liability. To limit the risk of liability to the ultimate interest holders,_
most general partners in LPs would consist of an entity with a liability

.,

through Pub. L. No. I06-580, approved 12-29-2000). The "check the box'• rules free the practitioner from
the task of structuring LLC documents in a manner calculated to pass the IRS factors relating to corporate
characteristics and provide certainty as to the tax treatment of the entity.
11. Susan Pace Hamill, 'I'M LimiUd Lia~ Company: A Catagst Exposing~ Corporale Integration Qgestinn,
95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 395 ( 1996). Professor Hamill provides an appendix s~tting forth the approximate
, number of new LLC filings in several states. Id. at 44()..46. Su alsoJames_G. Leyden;J r ·;A K9 SlQJe '.f App:roach
to UCs: Delaware can be Differmt, Bus. L. TODAY, May-june 2000, at 51. More than 100,000 LLCs have
been formed under Delaware law in comparison with approximately 290,000 Delaware corporations. ld.
•
After the check the box rules, there· was another wave of amendments to state lLC statutes to reflect the
ability ofthc entities to maintain partnership classification regardless of the application of the IRS' corporate
·characteristic factors. Set generai!J Laurel Wheeling Farrar &. Susan Pace Hamill, DissociaJion from Alabama
Limiled Liahili!J CfJmpanw in 1111 Posl Check-1M-Box Era~ 49 ALA. L. REV. 909 {1988). Although the National
Conference of Commissioners on Unifor:m State Laws (NCCUSL) has developed a Uniform ·u mited
Liability Company Act (ULLCA), most states have not yet been receptive to adopting the provisions as a
whole, and there are still significant differences in individual state LLC statutes. Kathleen D. Fuentes, limited
Li4hili9 Companies and Opting-Out qfliJJbilig: A New Sltmdatdfor Fiduciary DulW?, 27 SETON HAiJ.L. REV. I023,
I024 (1997). Some commentators dispute the usefulne~ of having states adopt a uniform LLC _a ct See, ~.g.,
Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform lmt.•s, Motkllows and LimiJed Liahilig Companies, 66 U.
Cow. L. REV. 947 (1995) (asserting that the ULLCA is unnecessary and is likely to make LLC law less
efficient). In some states it is still not possible to fonn a single member LLC, and there are significant
differences in how states treat LLCs for state tax purposes. Sugeneral!J CaroiJ. Miller et al., limiJed liahili!J
Companw Bifor~ and After ~ ]anUilty 1997 JRS "Check-tke•Box" &gulalions: Clwice uf Enti!J and Tnxation
Considerations, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 585 {1998). See also generalg Bruce P. Ely 8t Peter·C. Bond, State Taxalitm tif

ILCs, UPs and Rl.LPs, An Updalt, 2 Bus. ENTITlES 38 (2000).
12~ Paul R. Erickson &BuddyJ. Sanders,Asses.fUwUCsv.UPs, 28TEXASTECHL. REV. 1005, 1005
(1997). The establishment of the LLP was triggered by the savings and loan failures in the 1980s and
subsequent lawsuits against lawyers and accountants relating to their bank and thrift work. Robert W.
Hamilton, /Ugirlered limiled liahifitJ Partnerships: Present at lhe Birth (Hear~), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. I 065, 1069
(1995). Similar to the LLC statutes, many LIP provisions have been the focus of amendment since their
implementation. NCCUSL adopted limited liability partnership amendments to its Uniform Partnership
Act at its annual meeting in July 1996. The amended act is hereinafter referred to as the ULLPA.
EUZABETH G. HESTER, Prt~ttical GWk to RAgislertd Limild LiJJbili/y Partnerships, in 5 STATE LIMITED LIABIUTY
COMPANY AND PARTNERSHIP LAWS§ 1 (Michael A. Bamberger & Arthur J.Jacobson eds., 1995). See also
generaJ!y CanerJ. Bishop, 'Tiu8 Limiltd LUzhilig Partnership Ammdmmts ltJ Ike Uniform Partnrrship Act (1994), 53 Bus.
L. I0 1 (1997).
.
13. SugeneraJ9 CLEMENT BATES, THELAWOFLIMITEDPARTNERSHIP 33 (1886).

• •
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14

Limited partners were at risk for
personal liability for LP obligations only if they participated in the
control of the business and if the creditor reasonably believed that they
15
were acting as general partners. As .LP statutes developed, safe harbor
provisions were drafted delineating the types of activities that a limited
16
partner could participate in without lo$ing limited liability status.
A state that has adopted LLLP lattguage allows the general partner
of the LP to have the same type of protection that is available to general
17
partners electing LLP status. The treatment oflimited partners in a
LLLP is complicated by the states' adoption of language in the Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA), providing that the,Uniform
Partnership Act provisions only apply to cases not provided for in the
18
RULPA.
As the RULPA includes specific rules relating to the
personal liability of a limited partner to a creditor, it appears that the
19
judiciary would respect those RULPA rules. Due to the difference in
the way that limited partners have historically lost their limited liability
status and the lack of universal adoption of provisions allowing LPs to
20
become 14I . I,Ps, the focus in this paper will be on LLCs and I . IJPs.

B. Description ofUCs and UPs
In addition to establishing an entity by fuing a simple short document
with the relevant governmental authority, most members ofLLCs enter
into "Operating Agreements" that define-the relationship among the

members. Operating Agreements generally include provisions relating
to the allocation of membership interests, tax benefits and profits as well
•

14. Gases have consistently held that the use of a corporation to act as a _general partner of a limited
partnership is valid absent fraud. E.g.1 Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Prop., Inc~, 562 P.2d 244 {Wash.
1977) (illustrating 'the ability or a corporation to act· as a general partner ofa limited partnership).
15. Bishop, SU/J'ftJ note 12, at Ill.
16. .SU, ,.g., REV._UNJF. LTD. p•sHIPACT § 303 (1976) (amended 1985) [hereinaner RULPA].
17. The LP files the necessary fonns to elect U.P status and the general partners of the LP are
covered by the same limited liability language as panner'S in UPs. &, ~og., ARJZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 291026 (West, WESTLAW thro\.lgh 2000 2d Reg. Sess. and 5th Spec. Sess.) (stating that as to limited
partnerships, which are-limited liability partnerships, the section on partner liability (including the language
relating to entity formalities) will apply to "general partners and to any of its limited panners who, ... are
liable for the debts or obligations of the pannership'•); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-214 (WESTLAW
through 2000 Reg. Sess.); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 359.172 (West, WESTLAW through 2d Reg. Sess., of the 90th
General Asscmb. (2000)).
18. RULPA § 1105 (1985).
19. Bishop~ SUJirG note 12, at Ill.
20. As ofjanuary I, 2001, only sixteen_states_had statutory provisions relating to the LLLP fornt.
Dem A. Hopkins, U/Ps- A New limiletlliobilig Optima, CCH Limited liability Company Guide: lLC
Advisor, Nov. 16,2000, at 4. This article also discusses dae fact that some states appear to recognize I.IJ.Ps
without a specific statuto.ry provision. /d.

\)
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21

as set forth the management structure of the LLC. There are two
22
different general structures for the management of LLCs. In the first
structure, the members retain the right to manage the entity. In the
second structure, the members provide for one or more managers to
manage the entity. The ability of all of the members to be involved in
the management of the entity without losing their limited liability status
(unlike limited partners of an LP) is c.onsidered to be a significant
23
advantage of the LLC structure. The management and control of an
entity may be a significant issue if there is a claim that the limited
liability shield should be pierced in order to access the assets of an
individual member.
A general partnership establishes itselfas an LLP by filing a document
with the relevant governmental authority. The remainder of the
provisions of a state's partnership act will continue to apply to a LLP as
if it was a general partnership. Unlike LLCs, where there is still
uncertainty as to the guidelines that will be placed on individual
members and their relationships, the standards that have applied to
general partners will likely apply in LLPs without change. A reflection
of this is that q~alification of a general partnership as an LLP does not
require any substantive modification ofsuch entity's general partnership
24
agreement. In fact, some provisions, including the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act, specifically provide that a general partnership that files
25
for LLP status is the same entity before and after registration.
Some states have imposed additional requirements on general
partnerships desiring to obtain I.I.P status. Several states have adopted
26
mandatory insurance requirements for LLPs. Some ofthese insurance

2 J• Unlike corporation statutes, LLC statutes generally do not provide for specific corporate
formalities, such as annual meetings for interest holden; thus, even if an Operating Agreement is not
required by the relevant state statute, as a practical measure it is necessary for the members to enter into
some type of agreement relating to the organization of the entity.
22. State statutes generally require that if an LLC is to be manager managed, that fact must be set
out in the Articles of Organization filed with the Secretary of State's office. What will be most striking to
someone who is familiar with standard features of corporate codes is not what is similar but what appears
to be missing in LLC statutes. For example, generally there are no·safeguards for interest holders in the
entities to have a say in the management of the entity absent the election of the entity to be member
managed. This "lack of protection'' illustrates the Oexibility that parties have in fornaing LLCs.
23. Initially, the tax benefits available by using this new entity were considered the primary reason
for the explosion in use of LLCs. In addition, there are significant advantages to the business and
management provisions found in LLC statutes. Hamill, supra note 11, at 395.
.
24. The agreement would, ofcourse, have to be amended to reflect the entity's new status as an LLP
and the new name, but all other issues such as contribution, profit and loss allocations are not impacted by
the addition of the limited liability shield.
25. RUPA § 201(b) (1997).
26. Su, ~wg., AK. STAT.§ 32.05.565 (Matthew Bender, WESTLAW through Third Spec. Sess. of the
Twenty-First Leg. (2000)); CAL CORP. CODE§ 16956 (West, WESTLAW through 1999-2000 Reg. Sess.

•
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requirements apply only if the IJ..P partners are licensed to provide
27

professional seiVices, and there are often alternatives to insurance.
The minimum monetary requirements also vary considerably, with
28
some of the limits determined by th~~ number of partners.
'

C. Liabili!J Provisions ofUCs and LlPs

•

•

Common among all LLC statutes are provisions articulating the
general rule that members and managers ofLLCs Will not be responsible for the LLCs' debts or liabilities solely because of their status as
29
members or managers. Unlike corporate statutes' liability provisions
that have developed a commonality throughout the long history of
corpo~ate law, the language used in liability provisions ofLLC statutes
30
varies significantly among the states. One distinction can be made by
analyzing who will be covered by the provisions. The coverage can

ranie from members alone to members, managers, agents and employ1
ees. As in
the
case
of
officers
and
directors
of
corporations,
members
.
and Jst Exec. Sess. and Nov. 7, 2000 Election); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, subtit.ll, ch. 15 § 1546 {WESTLAW
through 1999 1st Spec. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54,§ 1-309 (West, WESTLAW through Chapter 9
of2000 lst Exec. Sess.); S.C.CooEANN. § 3341·1130 (WESTLAW through 2000 Reg. Sess.); TEX. REV.
STAT.ANN.art.6J32b,§3.08{West, WESTLAWthrough 1999Reg. Sess.); W. VA.CODEANN.§47B-10-5
(Matthew Bender, WESTLAW through 2000 1st Exec. Sess~)·
.
27. Su, t.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 25.05.125 (West, ·WESTLAW through 2000 2d Spec. SeS5.).
Initially, it was thought that professionals such as attonteys and accountants would be the most likely. to
utilize I J .P provisions, even though most statutes do not limit their use to professional pannerships. Sa
Hester, supra note 12, § 1.
28. Stt 15 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 8206 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 Reg. Sess.).
29. For a case interpreting the liability language of the Delaware statute, see Ptp.ri-Cokz Bouling Co. v.
Hant!J, No. 1973-5, 2000 WL 364199 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2000) emphasizing that the liability protection for
members will not be in force until the LLC is properly for1ned. In addition, members must be cautious to
take appropriate actions to preserve their limited liability status upon dissolution of an entity. For an
example of a situation where a fornter member of an LLC was held liable for a debt, see New H~ons Suppfy
Cooperalivt v. H~JJUk, 590 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). Outside the scope of this article is the issue of
what liability members and managers owe to the other rr•embers of the LLC. Su gett4fal{y Richard A. Booth,
Fiduciary .Du!J1, Contrad and Wai.vtr in Parlnerships and LimiJed Liability
. , 1J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus.
L 55 (1997); Fuentes, supra note II, at I023 (considering the liability issue under Delaware and New York
statutes).
30. Robert B. Thompson, Th Limits ofliabilily u1 1M New Limiltd ~ Enhliu, 32 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1, 14 (1997).
31. /d. at 14. In addition, the language used to describe the coverage varies with the mosl common
phrase, including the word "solely,,. to define the limitation on liability. ld. Similar to corporations,
members may have certain liabilities to the LLC itself. Su Harvey Gelb, l.UJIJiliJia ofMmalms and Mano,ers
of ~oming Limiled ~ Companin, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 133, 137 {1996) (analyzing one state
statute). Under state statutes, members can be held liable: for contributions to the LLC that have been listed
as made or scheduled to be made in the future. If a mernber receives a return of capital, under some state
statutory provisions, such member may be liable for the equivaJent sum if it is needed to discharge certain
liabilities of specified creditors. ld. at 138. Set also Ptpsi-Cola Bottling Co., 2000 WL 364199, at *5 (discussing
the impact of improper distribution). Members not acting under an authorized LLC (due to the involuntary
•
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and managers ofLLCs will not be able to shield themselves from claims
relatin8 to theirpersonal conduct outside the scope of their roles in such
3
LLCs,
·
The shield of limited liability that is created by individual state
provisions for LLPs can also vary significandy. Many states have
adopted an approach that will shield LLP partners from liabilities, debts
or obligations incurred by the entity arising from the negligence,
malpractice, wrongful act or misconduct committed by anotherpartner,
33
employee or agent of the partnership~ A partner's own negligence,
malpractice, wrongful act or misconduct (or some_one under his or her
34
direct supervision) may be excluded from the limited liability shield.
The trend appears to be to provide for a greater shield of protection in
35
LLPs - similar to the limited liability shield found in LLCs. The
narrower scope of liability protection allowed under LLP provisions
versus .LLC provisions may be partially explained by the expected use
of LLPs primarily by professionals, where it would be a violation of the
professional's rules of conduct to allow a person to limit the scope ofhis
36
or her malpractice.
•

dissolution of the entity, for example) are likely lo be held jointly and severally liable for all debts and
liabilities of the entity. Gelb, supra, atl39. One advantage of most LLC statutes is that unlike LLP limited
liability provisionst LLC statutes generally are structured similarly to corporation statutes that provide for
retroactive limited liability protection for the entity's interest holders when 1he members_take necessary steps
to cure an issue such as administrative dissolution.
32. Karin Schwindt, Limiled Liabili; Companw: Issues V. Member Iia/rili-9, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1541,
J548 (1997). There have been situations in which officers of companies are held liable for actions taken
within the course of their employment. Liability for fraud related to the Medicare system has recently caused
officers in health care companies concern. Margaret G-raham Tebo, Gui/&·1!1 Reason l![Thle, 86 A.B.A.J. 44,
44 (May 2000). There is also the possibility that corporate officers will be held personally liable for patent
infringement. Joseph M. Sauer, A Tear in IN C"'fKWal6 Veil: 1M Liabilig of Corporau 0./foers for Patent
lnfiingernmt, 37 DUQ, L. REV. 89 (1998). The application _o f corporate-type agency law to impose personal
liability on members of LLCs is another area that has not yet been significantly developed.
It
has
been
•
argued, and there is some limited case law supponing the proposition, that LLC members should be treated
similarly to officers, directors and shareholders of corporations in this cont,ext. Kendal R. Hoopes, Note,
Corporalions - Mtl~Ulps and Mmalms of Iimiled Li4lnlig CompilnW Wtll be H11d lo Ccrpqrall Ag~ and Personal
liobilig Principles, Water. Waste, & Land, Inc. v. Lanham, 955 P.2d 997 (Colo. 1998), 34 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 463, 470 (1999). In these cases, the couns appear to apply common law agency principles to the
activities of the members, regardless of statutory provisions relating to the limited liabilityofthe LLC. Unlike
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil (where application of the doctrine will always be to the detriment
ofthe member), the application of agency principles can benefit members of an LLC. Under general agency
principles, the principal (in .this case the LLC itself) will be liable for the agreement contracted on its behalf.
ld. at n.94.
33. Hester, _supra note I 2, § 2.
34. /d. This liability coverage is sometimes referred to as a "partial shield." Jd. The use ofpartial
shield coverage is on the decline.
35. ld. Twenty-two states phJ$ the District of Columbia have expand~d protection in their 'LLP
statutes. /d. Sometimes this liability coverage is referred to as_''full..shield" liability. S, id. The NCCUSL
also took this approach in the Uniforn1 Umited Uability Partnership Act. ld.
36.- Sel supra notes 12 and 27.
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THEORIES OF 'L IMITED I~IABIUTY

•

For purposes of this paper, "limited liability, refers to the ability of a
shareholder of a corporation or interest holder of a LLE to risk only the
37
capital that such individual invests ir1to the entity. Some commentators view limited liability as a privilege provided to interest holders by
states that allow for the form.ation of these entities under corporate and
38
other entity codes.
Others view limited liability as just one more
39
contractual tertn among creditors and owners. The theories supporting limited liability can be organized into arguments based on demo40
cratic ·principles arid arguments based on economic principles. There
has been more emphasis in recent decades on the economic arguments
supporting limited liability, but in order to understand the historical
basis of limited liability, it is necessary to also briefly consider the
41
democratic justifications for limited liability. Though the commentary
in this area has primarily related to corporations, the analysis can be
applied to all entities that have limited liability protection.

•

A. The Democratic Tlzeory ofLimited Liabili!J

...

.

It is difficult to determine the exact scope of limited liability for U.S.
shareholders in the eighteenth century, but the general rule in the early
42
nineteenth century was that shareholders had unlimited liability. The
imposition of unlimited liability on shareholders was based on the belief
that creditors would not extend necessary capital to manufacturing and

3'7. Theresa A. Gabaldon, '17141..emtmade Stand: Feminist and Oilier &jkelions onlh4limiled LiiJJJiJi!7 of
CorpliTale Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1394 (1992). Ste Robert W. Hillman, Limiled liabili!Y in
Hirtorical PersjJ«tWe, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 615 (1997) (detailing various periods, beginning with Roman
law, in the development of law and commerce where there have been efforts to limit liability}.
3_8. Larry E. Ribstein, LimiJed IJabili!y. and ~ ofIJu CorporaJian, 50 Mo. L. REV. 80, 81 (1991 ).
39. /d. at82.
40. Although the arguments in t.his paper are divided into democratic and economic principles, some
theories in these two arguments overlap.
41. As imponant as economic_models are to explain limited liability, Professor Thompson has stated
that the principles "undoubtedly ... do not capture fully the entire benefit of limited liability.'• Thompson,
supra note 4, at 22-23. Professor Thompson continues by stating that "the continued judicial preference for
limited liability in corporate groups ... may refiect a society·widejudgment that \he benefits of limited
liability exceed its costs.,, /d. at 23.
42. STEPHEN 8. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL§ 1.03 (1991) (looseleaf). See also
BLUMBERO, supra note 5, § 1.04.1 and § 1.04.4 (describing the emergence of limited liability); Mark I.
Weinstein, limiled ~in C~ifomio.: 1928-1931, in SOC. SCI. RES. NE1WORK ELECTRONIC LJBR. (Sept.
15, 2000), m http:/ I papers.ssm.com/sol3/ papers.frrn?cfid=3 10 186&cftoken= 1273033&abstract_id=
244333' (analyzing the economic effect of moving to a limited liability system in California).
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43

industrial concerns without this security. This view changed with time,
and by the 1840s most state legislatures had adopted provisions that
provided shareholders limited liability protection.# Commentators
•

discussing the democratic theory of limited liability often refer to this
historical development of corporate codes in the nineteenth century as
the event that triggered the almost universal adoption of provisions
45
·p roviding limited liability to shareholders. The idea behind the limited
liability provisions was that persons of modest means would be encour46
aged to act in an entrepreneurial manner. In addition, it was believed
that entry into business markets would be more competitive iflimited
47
liability for shareholders was the general rule.

B. Vze Economic Theory ofLimittd Liabili~
A commonly cited rationale for allowing limited liability for entities_
based on economic principles is described by Frank H. Easterbrook and
48
Daniel R. Fischel in their book, The Economic Structure of Corporate 1Aw. ·
Easterbrook and Fischel analyze the relationship between limited
49
liability and the theory of the firm. This theory advances the idea that
limited liability re_
duces_the costs that _arise due to the separation of
agents and owners of capital and the specialization inherent in corpora•

•

•
I

43. PRESSER, .supra note 42, § 1.03·.
44. Jtl. An exception to the general rule providing limited liability protection to shareholders was
applied to most bank shareholders who were subject to a double liability system (initial investment in entity
plus the par value of the stock) until the imposition of a federal system of deposit insurance in 1933. Lissa
'Lamkin Broome, Redisltibuling Bank ln.solvemy Risks:
·· . to Limiutl/iabiJi!y in lht Bank Holding Compf11!1
ShuttuYe~ 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 935, 941 (l993). There were attempts to revive unlimited liability in some
states, but they ultimately failed. BLUMBERG, supra note 5, § 1.04.6.
45. Stephen B. Presse.r,
. ·. 1M Calling oftlu Corporalion.· LimiJed I.iabili9, Dmw.crlJ9 and.Economics,
97 .N w. U. L. REV. 148,_155 ( 1992). Limited liability for corporate shareholders was not the universal view,
and debate and pockets of liability continued into the twentieth century. Gabaldon, supra note 37, at 1397.
Sa also BLUMBERG, supra note 5, § 2.0 I (discussing the survival of shareholder liability in specified situations
including double liability for shareholders generally, pro rata liability in California and shareholder liability
for wage claims).
46. Presser; supra note 45, at 155. One way ·to bridge the democratic and economic arguments is to
consider the fact that small businesses create most of the new jobs in the U.S. According to the U.S. Small
Business Administration, small businesses provide about 75°/o of the net new jobs. Office of Advocacy, U.S.
Small Business Administration, aJ http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/sbfaq.hunl Oast visited Feb. 12, 2001).
Without limited liability protection some people with limited means may not start or expand these businesses.
4 7. Presser, supra note 45, at I55.
48. ..W FRANK H. EAsTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL., THE ECONOMIC STRUCfURE OF
CORPORATELAW (19_
91). S, also BLUMB.ERG, supra note.5, §§ 4.01-4.04.
49. .Sa EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 48·, at 4]. Professors Easterbrook and Fischel also
discuss the connection between limited liability and the cost of capital to the finn. &e id. at 41-47.
'

,
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•

50

Easterbrook and Fischel's clis(;ussion raises several issues that are
51
impacted by limited Iiability:
tions.

A. Monitoring Costs. Limited liability will reduce monitoring costs for
investors. Investors monitor their ag·ents to a greater degree the more
2
risk they bear. 5 By reducing the amount of risk to investors, investors
will expend fewer resources on the mc,nitoring ofagents. Ifan unlimited
liability structure is used, investors will also need to expend resources to
•

53

monitor other interest holders.
B. Market Benefits. With limite':i liability, shares in entities are
54
homogeneous commodities and ca11 reflect a single market -p rice.
Allowing all investors to trade on the same terrns, the price of the shares
5
is based on all available inforrnation about the entity. 5 By facilitating
the free transferability of shares and pricing of shares (accordin,g to all
available information), a limited liability system supports market
6
informational efficiency. 5 U-sing this analysis, entities can also benefit
7
from a lower cost of capital. 5
C. Management Eificieng. Limited liability and the increased transfer58
ability of shares provide incentives for managers to act efficiendy. 'If
individual interest holders can sell their shares, it is possible for the ·

•

50. /d.
51. Stl also BLUMBERG~ supra note 5, §§ 4.02, 4.0~i (discussing many of-these same costs as theoretical
advantages and disadvantages of limited liability). Bul s~w Richard A. Booth, l.imiwJ Liabi1i!J and#& Ejfinml
Al/ocalion oJResour,,es, 89 NW. U. L. REV.I40, 147 (1994) (arguing why the economic arguments set forth by
Professors wterbrook and Fischel should fail). Professo•· Booth also raises additional arguments supponing
limited liability but finds that they ultimately fail as well. ld. at 149. In suppon of limited liability, Professor
Booth discusses the imponance of limited liability's role as a contracting device shifting the burden of
negotiation.for personal liability to creditors. Jd. at 151 •
52. EASTERBROOK&. FISCHEL, mpra note 48, at 41, 42. Monitoring agents will be limited to the risk
that an investor has in the firrn. Monitoring shareholders under limited liability will be limited, as the
individual wealth ·of the other shareholders does not impact the .probability. that a particular shareholder will
be required to pay off a judgment. ld.
53. /d. at 42.
54. ld. at 43. Shares in this discussion would also refer to other types of ownership interests, such as
partnership or limited, liability company interests.
55. /d..
56. Ribstein, supra note 38, at 99. In order to accept that limited liability supports market efficiency,
it is necessary to accept the theory known as the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH), which holds
in varying degrees that securities prices reflect all available infornlation. The weak venion of ECMH holds
that past price information is not predictive of future price movements. The semi-strong version ofECMH
provides that all p.ublicly available infonnation is quickly reflected in the market price of the security. Under
the strong version of ECMH, all inforanation, even non-public inforanation, is reRected in the market price
of securities. WIWAM A. KLEIN &jOHN C. COFFEEJR~, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE, LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPI.ES 395 (2000).
57. Ribstein, supra note 38, at I00 (arguing that efficient market pricing reduces a firn,,s cost of capital
because of lower investor information costs).
58. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 48; at 42. If investors are able to ;s.eiJ their interests,
existing managers in poorly-run fi rrns can be displaced by investors who assemble a voting majority to install
new managerial teams. ld.

•

•

'

•

•
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management team to be replaced when new investors install their own
59
managerial choices.
·

D. Supports Diversification. Limited liability allows for a. more efficient
60
diversification of investors' portfolios. Under an uruimited liability
regime, investors would reduce the number of investments to minimize
the risk oflosing their individual wealth due to a claim against one of the
•

companies.

E.

Investment Benefits. Finally, limited liability protection aids
61
management in.making optimal decisions on investments. Managers
can invest in any project with positive net present value, including
higher risk ventures, because investors will not lose more than their
62
investment if such project fails.
Support for an economic justification for limited liability is based on ·
the premise that there is not a simple shifting of loss from interest
holders to creditors, b·u tinstead there is a change in behavior due to the
63
limited liability status o( interest holders. In addition, there is an
argument that even if there was a 100°/o shift in loss, voluntary creditors
possess a comparative advantage over interest holders because of their
64

ability to monitor at least some ofan entity's managerial activities. If
interest holders are granted limited liability protection, creditors and
interest holders can be viewed as engaging in a risk sharing arrange-

ment.65
The economic benefits concurrent with limited liability appear to be
reduced if an entity is closely held, due to the lack of separation between
management and the risk bearers. Due to the close relationship
between the management and interest holders, there is no cost savings

in connection with the monitoring of agents, and because many closely
held entities restrict the transfer ofinterests, the capital markets may not
66
reflect the limited liability advantage.
59. ld.
60. ld. al43. Investors can cut risk by holding a diversified portfolio of assets. Jd. If limited liability
was not available, investors would be more likely to only invest in a few entities and there would be a
variance in share valuation based not on the inherent value of the entity but on the personal wealth of the
shareholder. Gabaldon, supra note 37, at 1405.
61. EASTERBROOK 8t FISCHEL, supra note 48, at 43~ Professors Easterbrook and Fischel recognize
that the cost savings due to limited liability can .be -significandy reduced in close corporations; and they
discuss the use of the doctrine of piercing the corporate -veil to illustrate this distinction. /d. at 55.
62. ld. at44. Investments in projects with positive net present values are considered beneficial uses
of capital. ld. With ponfolio diversification, investors are also able to hedge againS,t the risk of one project
failing. ld.
63. ld. at 45.
64. ld. at46.
65. Creditors often require interest holders to provide personal guarantees or security in order lo
manage this risk.
·
66. EASTERBROOK&. FISCHEL, supra note 48,- at 56.
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Some commentators disagree with the view that limited liability for
closely held entities is less justified!!ti? These commentators emphasize
the ability of parties in closely held companies to diversify investments
68
and bear loss. An argument can be made that by using venture capital
and debt, a closely held entity can ttave significant separation between
management and risk bearers, thereby causing the participants in such
an entity to act more like· their ptlblic entity countexparts and thus
gaining the ability to apply the cost savings of limited liability in a
similar fashion.
Theoretically, entities that have limited liability protection are more
69
likely to have insufficient assets a\"ailable to pay credi~ors' claims.
Some. commentators· have proposed reducing or even eliminating
70
limited liability coverage. Supporting these proposals is the theory that
limited liability creates a_moral hazard because interest holders are_able
71
to receive all the benefits of risky activities without all the costs.
Proponents of limited liability recognize that this externality of risk may
impose undesirable social costs, but they minimize the magnitude ofrisk
extemalization. and do not accept the premise that abolishing limited
72
liability would reduce the moral hazard. Commentators advocating
a change in the limited liability status of interest holders generally
propose alternative liability rules, including pro rata liability. These
arguments focus on the inefficiencies created by limited liability, such as

•

67. E.g., David W. Leebron,JimiluJLiabili!Y, TorJ Yaclims, andCredilors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1626
( 1991 ). See also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note: 48. at 55 (discussing the distinction between close
versus publicly held corporations).
68. E.g., Leebron,supra note 67, _at 1626. Even ifdosely held cprporation shareholders are granted
limited liability, Professor ~ebron would subject the grant to three constraints, including the requirement
that shareholders/managers of closely held corporations have an obligation to provide adequate insurance
to cover claims of forese~able tort victims. Id. at 1636. ty.: Ribstein, supra note 38, at I0 1. Professor Ribstein
discusses the benefits of limited liability to closely held <:omparties ·and argues that limited liability serves an
important function in closely held firms. Jd. at I06.
69. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 48, at 49. See also BLUMBERG, mpra note 5, § 4.03 el seq.
(discussing theoretical disadvantages to limited liability, including the distinction between tort and contract
creditors).
70.

Henry Hansmann &. Reinier Kraakman, Towatd Unlimited Shore/wider LiabiJi!1 jM Corptwau
Torts, I00 YALE LJ. 1879, 1932-34 ( 1991 ). But see Michael P. Coffey, In Defense. ofLimited Liabili!Y- A Rep~
to Hansmann and Krllllhnan, 1 GEo. MASON L. REV. 59 (1994). Set also janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimiled
Share/wider LiaiJili!y Througla a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV~ L. REV•. 387 (1992) (arguing that Hansmann and
Kraakman underestimate the proced.._rat _obstacles to their proposal to eliminate limited liability for tort
claims); but if. Hansmann &Kraakman,A Procedural Focus on Unlitniled$kareh.older lialiil~, JOG HARV. L. REV.
446 (responding to Alexander's anicle). See alsoJoseph A. Grundfest, 1M l.imikd Future ofUnlimi.Jed Liahili!J:
A Capilal Markets PerspeciWe, 102 YALELJ. 387 (1992) (a defense oflimited liability);. bul cf. Henry Hansmann
_& Reiniet Kraakman, Do lite CapiJal Markas CompellimillJ Uo.bil~? A Response to Pr'!fessor Grundfest, I02 YALE
LJ. 427 (1992) (response to Grundfest's article).
7 1. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 48, at 50.
72. ld. The externality of risk can be, limited to involuntary creditors. /d.
E.g~,

'

•

.
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incentives to "misinvest'' by aver-investing in hazardous industries and
73
under-investing in precautionary ones.
Some commentators who
propose eliminating limited liability in tort may not extend these
74
arguments to contract claims. The basis for retaining limited liability
for interest holders in contract claims is that the parties have already
75
efficiendy allocated the risks of the transaction. One way that.courts
have resolved the potential problems relating to limited liability is by
invoking the doctrine of veil piercing to impose unlimited liability in
76
individual cases.
.

Ill. THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE VEIL
•

Regardless of the innovative proposals of some commentators, the
ability of investors to choose an entity with limited liability protection
77
appears to be firmly entrenche-d in U.-S~ law. There have _always been
exceptions to this general rule regarding limited liability, including the
liability of shareholders for failure to pay full consideration for their
78
shares and, in certain cases, liability for debts to corporate employees.
The courts' ability to pierce the veil of an entity· is based on their
79
general authority to apply equitable principles. Although co_urts use
a variety of methods to determine when piercing is appropriate, the
result is that an entity's shield of limited liability protection is disregarded to reach an individual interest holder's assets when such result
80
is deemed to be in the interest of "fairness., In such cases, the actions
(or inactions) of an interest holder result in the removal of the shield of
limited liability and allow creditors to access such interest holder,s_assets .

•

.

·73. Hansmann & Kraakman, Towatd Unlimited SluzrJ.oltkr Liabili9for Corptwau Torts, supra note 70, at
1882~85.

74. E.g., id. at 1919. Thus, even if Professors Hansmann and Kraakman and oilier proponents of
eliminating limited liability in tort claims were successful in changing this rule, limited liability for contractual
claims and the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil (as it ,applies to contract claims) would remain a tool
for courts to use as necessary. Sa itifra notes 77-161 and accompanying text (discussing piercing the veil).
75. /d.
76. Coffey, supra note 70, at 73.
77. See Leebron, supra note 67, at 1566. "[F]ew topics are liable to strike the reader as less likely to
produce changes in the law than an analysis of limited liabifity. No principle seems more established in
capitalist law or more essential to the functioning of the modem corporate economy!' ld. (citations omitted).
.
78. PRESSER, supra note 1-2, § 1.0 I. Su also KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 56, at I 39.
79. The legal basis for courts piercing the veil is obscure. EASTERBROOK &FISCHEL, supra note 48,_
at 54.
80. Veil piercing is commonly used to reach the assets of individual interest holders. Creditors may
reach the assets of "siste·r " corporations through what is sometimes referred to as a process of "reverse
piercing., This can be teferred to as "enterprise liability." The_veil piercing doctrine is also known as the
doctrine of corporate disregard.
·

•
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The question of whether to apply the doctrine of piercing the veil to
new forms of LLEs in the same manner as it is applied to corporations
is complicated by the lack of uniformity in the application of the theory
to corporations themselves. A descriJ>tion ofthe various "rules." relating
to the doctrine of piercing the veil is difficult to define because of the
seemingly random manner in which courts have applied the doctrine.
Commentators have described the rationale for piercing the veil as
vague and illusory and application of the doctrine itself as "~]ike
81
lightning . . . rare, severe, and unprincipled." Perhaps the only
common element among piercing cases is that there; must be an
82
und.e rlying claim against the entity.
Several theories relate to the development of the veil piercing
83
doctrine. It is not surprising that cornmentators are unable to agree on
the historical underpinnings of the doctrine, given that there is no
consensus among commentators and the courts as to which situations
84
Theories relating to veil piercing
the doctrine should be applied.
historically have utilized broad and intuitive approaches to articulate the
85
proper circumstances
for
the
doctrine's
application~
One
theory
.
.

.

81. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limiled liabi/i9and tltl Corporation; 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
89, 89 (1985). ..W also PRESSER, supra note 42, § 1.0 I. Other descriptions of piercing the corporate veil cases
illustrate the confusion in the area. s-, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Pier&inglll4 Corpora/4 Ytil: An EmpitUal Stut!J;
76 CORNEU.. L. RE.V. 1036, 1037 (1991). One of.the most frequently cited opinions describing this lack of
unifom--.ity was written by Judge Cardozo in -~ v. 11tirdA~ Railuxg Co., 155 N.E. 58,61 (N.Y. 1926)
(describing the veil piercing doctrine as being "enveloped in the mists of metaphor,). Examples of the
citation of the Cardozo opinion include Carsten Alting; Piercing ~ Corpora~~ Veil in Ameriean and Gtmum Lmv
- liobi/i!1 of Individuals and Enlilies: A ComparalilJI Yaezv, 2 TUI.SAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. I87, 193 (1995) and
Sandra K. Miller,. Pimi.ttg 1M CopottJJe Vtil Anumg A.JlilU*d
. in the European Communf9 and in 1M U.S.:
A Comparativt Arza!ysis ofU.S., German, and U.K. Veii-PiercingApjwrxl&lw, 36 AM. Bus. LJ. 73, 77 (1998).
82. As Professor Clark states, "cases attempting to pierce the corporate veil are unified more by the
remedy sought subjecting to.corporateJiabilities the personal assets directly held by shareholders ·than
by repeated and consistent application of the same criteria for ·granting the remedy.'' Robert Charles Clark,.
1M DuiW oflhe Corparale Debtor lo its Crdilors, 90 HARV. I... REV. 505, 541 (1977).
83~ ·~ PRESSER, supra note 42, § 1.02. h is imponant to note that other than the references to the
application of the-doctrine of piercing the corporate-veil to U..Cs (and to a lessor extent I .I.Ps), it is unusual
to have any statutory basis for the application of this doctrine. This stands in contrast to the universal use
of language in statutes providing for limited liability protection of shareholders. An exception to this general
rule is in the Texas Business Corporation Act provision that sets out..the circumstances under which
shareholders will be liable. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. an. 2.21 (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Reg.
Sess.). Sa also Thompson, supra note 81, at 1042.
84. The tenn "piercing the veil" has been traced to a 1912 article by Professor Wormser. Alting,
supra note 81, at 192 (citing l. Maurice Worrnser, ~f 1114 Veil ofIke Corporate~' 12 COLUM. L. REV.
496 ( 1912)). The.application of the do.ctrine is not .confined to .the. United States. Many:other countries have
developed similar theories. Jose .Engracia Antunes. TAe liabili~ oJPolycorporalt. EnlerfnirtS, 13 CONN.J. INT'L
L. 197, 215 (1999). -~ also Proceedings Fourtla Annual
·
Business lAw Symposium: Ml · ·
Corporalions and Cross Border Confols: .Naliotudi!J, Veil &dng and Sut:cusor Liahilig, 10 FLA.j. INT'L L. 221
(1995).

85. PRESSER, supra note 42, § 1~03 [4] (contrasting two broad and intuitive approaches with Frederick
Powell's three-pronged test).
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buttressing the courts' ability to pierce the veil is the purported
perversion of the co orate privilege based on the state's allowance of
.

.

the law and economic arguments relating the app.ropriate uses (and non87
uses) of the piercing doctrine have developed in recent decades.

A. 11lelnes in Veil Piercing

•

•

Each state (and sometimes even an individual court within a state) has
88
a different view on the appropriate circumstances for piercing the veil.
Legal scholarship has attempted to determine the decisional structure
of the cases and has developed some common themes. Perhaps the
most widely held belief is that it is easier to pierce the veil in a case
89
involving a tort creditor versus a contract creditor. In court opinions
that adopt this distinction, it is considered equitable to provide more
protection for the tort creditor, who generally does not choose to do
business with the tortfeasor, than for a contract creditor, who has the
capacity to negotiate for protection prior to entering into a relationship
90
with an entity. It is possible for contract creditors to obtain personal
guarantees from interest holders or increase their costs when dealing
91
with entities with limited liability protection.
Another common theme is that piercing occurs in· situations where
92
there is a parent-subsidiary relationship. One theoretical foundation
for piercing in a parent-subsidiary relationship is based on the doctrine
of agency where the parent acts as a principal and the subsidiary as its
93
agent. It is more common, however, for a court to find that a creditor
need simply show that the parent company exercised control over the
94
subsidiary in order to pierce the subsidiary's veil. One study showed
.

.

.

86. /d. § 1.02.
87. ld. § 1.04.

. 88. Su also infra note 158 (discussing piercing by federal courts).
89. Professor Thompson's s~udy found that this belief is empirically unfounded. Thompson, supra
note 81, at I058·59; Thompson, supra note 4, at 23-4.
90. PRESSER, supra note 42, § 1.05[3]. Professor Presser suggests that courts ought to pierce less
frequently in contract cases and cites several jurisdictions in which that theory appears to have gained
acceptance. Presser, supra note 45, at 168. The distinction between voluntary and involuntary creditors is
one that has also been analyzed in connection with priorities in bankruptcy. Su in.fta notes 212..221 and
•
accompany1ng text.
'
91. Cohen•Whelan, supra note 8, at 356.
92. See Thompson, supra note 81; at 1047. Professor Thompson's study did not find a single case
where piercing occurred in a publicly held corporation. Stl id.
93. PRESSER, supra note 42, § 1.05(4].
94. Miller, supra note 81, at 80. Professor Miller also states that such control must be accompanied
by fraudulent; illegal or other improper conduct that creates an injustice. Iii. This 1ype of conduct is
described in the factors di~ussed in notes 102, I03 and accompanying text.

•
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that a court is more likely to pierce the veil if an individual, rather than
95
another entity, is to be liable., Case law tends to treat piercing against
individuals and entities the same, so it is difficult to analyze why
individuals are more likely to be impacted by the doctrine-. The higher
level of legal sophistication .in companies, with multiple entities may
seiVe to protect against the application of.some of the factors that courts
apply, specifically the lack of corpora.te formalities. In addition, courts
may also consider the multiple roles ofsome individuals as employees of
the parent as well as the subsidiary entity. It is difficult to deterrnine in
this context whether such personnel were acting within the scope of
96
their employment for the parent or fbrthe subsidiary.
A final general theme is that application of the doctrine s,eems to be
limited to entities that are closely held. An empirical study that
reviewed 16'00 cases from the 1960s to 1990 did not find a single
97
successful piercing case targeting a public corporation. It is clear that
mere overlap ~f owners~ip in an enti~ roup, or interest owne?hip, will
9
not be suffic1ent to pterce the ved..
Regardless of the Increased
likelihood of piercing in cqrporations with few or single shareholders, it

is well established that there,are no grounds for per se piercing based on
99
the closely held status of an entity.
These themes should have a ne11tral impact on LLEs, given the
expansion in the. numbers and uses of these entities. Initially, it
appeared that LLEs were,used primarily as· an alternative to S corporations, or general or limited p,artnerships, so there were some limitations
on the complexity ofthe entity. Because the adoption ofLLE statutes
by all ftfty states and the District of Columbia has resolved any possible
issue ofrecognition ofLLEs, and the certainty of tax treatments ofLLCs
has increased, these forms are being utilized by a wide range of actors,
100
including joint ventures of large corporate organizations. Given that
LLEs will likely be used for the sam.e reasons that corporations were

95. Thompson, supra note 81, at 1038.
96. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercint: An Alkmjll to Lifl• Veil of Cm..fosimt. Surrounding Ike Doctrinl
ofPiercing 1/tt Corporok Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853, 897-898 (1997l.
97. Thompson, supra note 81, at 1047.
98. ld. at 1071.
99. Cf Gevurtz, supra note 96, at ,863 (discussing closely held corporations). Professor Thompson~s
-study also found that it is more likely for piercing to occur as the number of shareholders decreases.
Thompson, supra note 81, at 1054.
100. Sa Nikhil Deogun &. Betsy McKay, Co& mad P&G Plan to Creou I 4.2 Billion Juict· and Snack
Co.mpany, WAILST;j., Feb. 21, 2001, at BJ (formation <>flimited liability company to develop and market
juices,juicc:-based drinks and snacks). In fact, there may be some disadvantages to using the LLC form with
partnership tax treatment if the persons foraning the enti~y believe that they will be soliciting venture capital
financing. Steven F. Carman, Venlurt-Ca/1 FtliUls EsclwJ lnoutmmls in UCs &Mjils ofllr4 UC Foma, Sue/a as Flow·
Tlw.augh Taxalitm, ar:t ofI.iJIU Value to Vm~ur, Funt!s, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1998, at B 13.
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, used in the past, it does not appear that the doctrine ofveil piercing will
be applied to LLEs in any greater or lesser degree as a result of these
themes.

B. Factors in Veil Piercing
Courts tend to apply similar factors when analyzing the appropriate101
ness of veil piercing.
In addition to the factors listed below, it is
common for courts to pierce the limited liability shield only if the entity
has been used to .erpetuate a fraud or if a failure to pierce would
of veil piercing, and although they can be viewed as separate concepts,
courts tend to use the terms interchangeably when discussing this aspect
of veil piercing~ The types of actions or behaviors that constitute fraud
are not generally defined by the courts, although certain types of
representations appear to arise frequendy in piercing cases involving
contra_ct claims. These-representations can be broken down into three
categories: (1) representations concerning the entity's financial status,
(2) representations relating to the entity's performance, and (3) represen103
tations that someone besides the entity will stand behind the debt.
Courts commonly find that "failure to pierce would promote injustice"
when supporting the piercing claims of tort creditors. Given the nalure
ofLLEs and the policies supporting veil piercing, it would appear to be
appropriate to pierce the veil ofLLEs only ifthis fraud factor is available
or if there is a strong argument that failure to pierce would promote
104
injustice. In addition to this fraud/injustice aspect ofpiercing, courts
also use non-fraud factors to analyze the appropriateness of veil
piercing. These factors can be divided into three general categories:
compliance with corporate formalities, undercapitalization and
instrumentality or alter ego.
•

1. Cotporate Forrnalities

The first factor courts generally look to in determining whether to
pierce the corporate veil is whether the entity followed formalities and

I 0 I. Professor Gevurtt refers to this use of factors as the "template" approach. Gevurtz, supra note
96, at 856. Professor Gevurtz also discusses judicial holdings that explain their decision to pierce by using
perjorative reasoning or a character test. /d. at 855.
-·
102. /d. at 871·873.

I 03. Id.
I04. Set infra Par·t IV and accompanying notes (discussing alternatives to the common law system that
may more consistently accomplish the policy goals of veil piercing).

•
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kept adequate records of its business. An example of this typ,e of
conduct is the failure to have or n1aintain records of shareholder or
105
director meetings. Critics say that it is inappropriate for courts to use
this factor to pierce the veil in the corporate context because there is no
connection between the conduct (failing to keep records) and the wrong
106
leading to the piercing. One way to consider this issue is to determine
why legislatures include certain formality requirements in corporate
codes. Although there are certainly provisions in modern corporate
codes that are intended to protect creditors, such as restrictions on the
issuance of dividends, many corporate fortnalities cited by courts are
107
clearly intended to protect shareholders.
The argument supporting
the application of this factor in v~!il piercing is that record-keeping
formalities assist in determining the conduct of shareholders and the
108
corporation at the time the cause of action arose,.
The application of this factor in the LLE context is especi~lly
problematic given the flexibility LLE provisions have relating to entity
formalities. Unlike in the development of the shareholder protections
in corporate codes, itappears improlbable, at least in the short term, that
states will amend their LLC statutes in a manner that would remove the
flexibility of members to choose the formalities the entities must
follow. tog Considerin,g the languag~~ in state statutes that addresses the
application of this factor to LLCs, the significant freedom LLCs have to
set the level offormalities and the questionable utility of this factor in the
corporate context, courts should refrain from using this factor to pierce
110
the veil of an LLC.
I ..I . Ps are also not required to engage in actions
similar to cotporate forrnalities, and this factor would appear to be
111
equally,irrelevant if-a court is considering piercing the veil of an LLP.
•

105. Cevurtz, supra note 96, at 867.
106. ld, Some commentators have criticized the use of this factor as being theoretically unsound ..
Professor Thompson's study found ,the use of this factor C\8 less important than other factors that have a more
substantive impact on an entity's status. Thompson, sUpra note 81, at 1067.
107. Cevurtz, supra note 96, at 870. An example
a corporate formality intended to protect
shareholders is the requirement of annual shareholders meetings for the purpose of electing directors~
I08. /d. at 879.
·
109. One of the perceived advantages to LLCs is the ability of the members to eliminate these types
of fonnalities. Su su.pra note 21.
110. Carter G. Bishop, Unworport&d Limited Lit.rbili!J Bwinlss Organil;ations: Limiled LUzbilf.9 Companies
and Partnerships, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 985, 1036 (I 995) (stating that in the case of Massachusetts LLCs,
the "failure to observe the usual company. fornlalities should not constitute a ground for .piercing. . the liability
shield because an LLC may often be a small and info1mal operation'').
Ill. Id. at I 026. When discussing the ~pplication of veil piercing to LLPs, Professor Bishop asserts
that. due to the fundamental differences between full-shield Massachusetts I,J.Ps and corporations; there
should be modifications, in the application of the doctrine. /d.
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2. Undercapitalization
So~e

courts also consider undercapitalization of the entity to be an
112
important factor in the application of the doctrine of veil piercing.
The extent to which courts utilize this factor is in part dependent on
whether the court considers the ability of individuals to form entities
with limited liability protection to be a privilege granted by the state or
113
merely the result of a contractual relationship.
If a court adopts the
privilege theory, it is likely that it will give more · weight to the
undercapitalization factor, as an argument can be made that the ''spirit"
of the privilege is abused when the entity does not act in the public's
114
interest.
In contrast, if the contractual relationship theory is used to
· · support the establishment of a corporation, it is less likely that the court
115
will consider undercapitalization to be a significant factor. Under this
theory, states should have a limited role in determining adequate
capitalization, as the ability to establish an entity with limited liability
protection merely reflects a contractual relationship among the interest
116
holders.
The state allows for this classification because such
arrangements are viewed as an efficient way to provide support fo~ such
117
contractual relationships.
Unlike the factor of corporate formalities, it is possible to direcdy
118
apply the undercapitalization factor to LLEs. For all LLPs and LLCs
that choose to be classified as partnerships, pass-through taxation gives
119
them less incentive to maintain a capital resetve for later distribution.
One challenge for courts is to determine what level of capitalization is
sufficient, given the widely divergent needs of businesses and the
inability to determine what level of risk a particular business operator
120
should be willing to accept.
Although commentators have discussed
theoretical tests for inadequate capitalization, it is difficult to formulate

•

.

J 12. Professor Thompson's study found that undercapitalization was cited less frequently than
instrumentality and alter ego. Thompson, supra note 81, at I063. lfinadequate capitalization is the primary

factor supporting veil piercing, a more focused remedy would be to establish capitalization requirements to
provide a minimum level of assets to be available for creditors. See in.fta notes 190...206 and accompanying
text.

J J3. Eric Fox, Hert:ingiM Veil ofLimited l.iabil~ Companw, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1159 (1994).
114. PREssER, supra note 42, § I .02.
I I 5. Fox, supra note 113, at 1159.
116. PREsSER, mpra note 42, § 1.02.
117. I d.
118. Cohen-Whelan, supra note 8, at 35 7.
119. Id.
120. The cases are not at all clear on how to define inadequate capitalization. Gevurtz; supra note 96,
at 888. Set also in.fta notes 190-206 and accompanying text (discussing minimum capitalization or insurance
requirements as an alternative to the veil piercing doctrine).
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121

a test that is able to take into account unexpected tort liabilities.
If
there are no minimum capitalization or insurance requirements for a
particular business, it is problematic to bas_e the decision to pierce solely
122
Given the ability of contract creditors to
on underc_apitalization.
determine the level of capitalization, or even to require a minimal level
of capitalization, there is- a logical argument that this factor should only
be applied in tort cases where the creditor does not have the opportunity
to protect itself from the (in hindsight) unr~asonable risks that an entity
takes if such entity is undercapitalized.

•

-3. Instrumentality or Alter Ego

The final general category of factors that courts consider in the
context ofveil piercing is whether one. entity treats another entity's assets
as its own. This is refe_rred to as "instrumentality, or ''alter ego," and
it relates to the control or domination of an ·entity by its interest
123

holders.
Proof of commingling of funds or assets may be used ·to
124
illustrate the domination ofthe entity. The language used by courts
to describe the control or domination behavior is varied and is used
125
somewhat interc·h angeably.
Courts may encounter difficulties when
applying this factor because there is a fine line between proper
management and improper domination of an entity by its interest
holders.
The specific problem with applying this factor to I.I.Es is the fact that
126
statutory previsions support flexibility in I,I,E management.
Some
statutes specifically provide for decentralized management as a default

121. Leebron, supra note 67, at 1635.
l22. CJ Gewrtz, supra note 96~ at 882. Generally,.
undercapitalization
functions
as
just
one
of
a
.
number of factors used as_justification for piercing the corporate veil. In certain situations, however,:
inadequate capitalization alone has been used as an independent g_round for piercing the corporate veit
Leebron, supra note 67, at 1634. Historically, it w~ common for state codes to contain provisions relating
to minimum levels of capital. Galbadon, supra note 37, at 1397. There are still some states that have
minimum capital requirements; however, the amo~nt required is quite low. For example, the minimum
capital requirement is SIOOO in Alaska and Texas. AK. STAT.§ 10~10.030 (State of Alaska and .Matthew
Bender, WESTLAW through 3d Spec. Sess. of the Twenty-First Leg. (2000)); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 3.02 (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Reg. Scss.). In contrast, several states require minimum
of LLP p.rovisions._ ~supra notes 26-28_
insurance or another fortn of security. in order to lake advantage
.
and accompanying text.
123. Professor Gevunz has described this factor in connection with two multi-part tests,:each which
contains an element of fraud. Gewrtz, supra note 96, at 1!62.
124. /d. at 864.
125. Miller, supra note 81, at 91.
126. LLC statutes were spec:ifically established to allow for flexibility of the partnership management
model with the advantage of limited liability. S. supra notes 22. 23 and accompanying text (discussing the
management structures of LLCs).
•
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rule
while others make- centralized management the default.
Should the application of this factor depend on which management
129
structure is selected by a state as the default rule? The problen:t with
any type of test using management structure as the dividing line is that
in practice it is unlikely that the majority ofLLCs or LLPs will lie clearly
on one side or the other of the spectrum. Interest holders are likely to
take advantage of LLE provisions in part because they allow for a
hybrid organizational structure. Certainly, just as in the cotporate
context where_ shareholders may require supennajority voting for
important decisions, interest holders are likely, even in a centrally
managed entity, to acquire some role in the management and control
of the LLE. Given this background relating to the passage of LLE
provisions, any domination of the LLE management by the interest
holders, absent other equitable issues, would appear to be an
inappropriate factor for the courts to use to pierce the veil to the
detriment of the interest holders. Perhaps application of this factor
should not be based on how the entity is being run, but rather on the
motivation behind the management of the entity. This would bring the
discussion back to the factors that almost all courts consider - whether
there has been fraud or whether failure to pierce would promote
• •
•
lllJUStlce.

C. Statutory lAnguage Relating to Piercing the Veil
•

Some state legislatures have adopted language indicating the
anticipated use of the piercing doctrine against interest holders ofLLEs.
Many state LLC statutes have -addressed the piercing issue specifically,
with fewer states dealing with this issue in their LLP provisions. It is
perhaps no surprise that most of the states that have dealt with the issue
for LLPs have language in their LLC acts as well. States have taken
130
d~fferent approaches to deal with veil piercing in their LLE acts.
There is relatively little written legislative history for LLC and LLP
provisions, so it is difficult to determine the issues that were considered
in connection with veil piercing language, and the intent of legislatures
in some cases may only be inferred.

127. Cohen·Whelan, supra note 8, at 354.
128. Fox~ supra note 113, at 1168.
129., /d. at 1172.
130. Given the rapid amendment of LLE provisions, this paper does not attempt to provide a
comprehensive listing of all the states that fit within these categories but merely sets forth examples of some
of the language used. For a listing of ll..P provisions, see 5 STATE LIMITED LIABIUTV COMPANY&.
PARTNERSHIP LAWS (Michael A. Bamberger & Arthur J. Jacobson eds., 1995).
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There are several categories of statutes that relate to veil piercing.
In the first category are statutes that explicitly provide that the cotporate
132
Minnesota's LLC
doctrine of veil piercing should apply to LLEs.
statute exemplifies this category and provides that "case law that states
the conditions and circumstances under which the veil of a corporation
may be pierced under Minnesota law also applies to limited liability
133
companies."
.
Other statutes specifically reference a particular factor courts may use
in determining whether piercing is appropriate but do not explicitly
134
reference the doct~ne.
This typ·e of language is reflected in the
Unifotm Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) which states that
"[t]he failure of a limited liability company to obse!Ve the usual
company for1nalities or requirements relating to the exercise of its
company powers or management of its business is not a ground for
imposing personal liability on the me1nbers or managers for liabilities of
135
the company."
Given that there would be no reason to discuss this

131. For a chart listing various provisions relating to the liability of members. see I LARRY E. RtBSTEIN
& ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABIU1Y COMPANIES app. 12·1 (West
'
Group 1995).
· 132. For LLCs: CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 7-80-107 (West, WESTLAW through 2001 Ist Reg. Sess.)
("the court shall apply the case law which interprets the conditions and circumstances under which the
corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced under Colorado law''); N.D. CENT. CODE § I0-32-29
(LEXIS through 1999 Reg. Sess.) ("[t)he case law that states the conditions and circumstances under which
the corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced under North Dakota law also applies to limited liability
companies"); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 183.0304 (West, WESTLAW through 2001 Act 15, published 8/31/01)
("nothing in this chapter shall preclude a court from ignoring the limited liability company entity under
principles of common Iaw of this state that are similar to those applicable to business corporations and shareholders in this state and under circumstances that are not inconsistent with the purposes of this chapter").
For U.Ps: COLO.REV.STAT.ANN. § 7-64-1009{West, WESTLAW through 2001 1st Reg. Sess.)
(tracking the same language as the LLC statute but adding a provision clarifying that failure to observe the
formalities or requirements relating to the management of its business is not in itSelf a ground for imposing
personal liability on the partners for the debts of the I ,l.P); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 4.)..22-09 (LEXIS through
1999 Reg. Sess.) (tracking the same language as the LLC statute and adding a provision stating that "(t]he
use of informal procedures or arrangements for the management and for the conduct of business is not a
ground for piercing the limited liability shield.,).
133. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3228.303 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 Reg. Sess.). See also the
Minnesota I.I.P provision tracking the LLC language stating: "[C]ase law that states the conditions and
circumstances under which the corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced under Minnesota law aJso
applies to limited liability partnerships." MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 323.14 (West, WESTLA W through 2000 Reg.
Sess.).
134. Su LLCs: HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 428-303 (Matthew-Bender, WESTI.AW through 2000 Spec.
Sess.); 805 IlL. COMP. STAT. ANN.§ 180/10-10 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 Reg. Sess.); MoNT.
CODE ANN.§ 35-8-304 (WESTLAW through 2000 Spec. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT.§ 63.165 (WESTLAW
through 1999 Reg. Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-303 (WESTLAW through 2000 Reg. Sess.); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-217 -I 0 1 (WESTLAW through 1999 R.eg. Sess.).
135. ULLCA § 303(b) (1995). The comments following this section in the ULLCA do not discuss this
subsection of the act. An interesting example of a statute that has been revised to utilize this type oflanguage
is the West Virginia Code. An earlier version of the statute stated that members have "the same rights and
liabilities as directors of corporations so organized or registered." W. VA. CODE § 3 1-1 A-33 (Michie

•
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factor absent the application of the doctrine, it is reasonable to infer that
the legislature intended courts to apply the piercing doctrine with the
modification provided in the statute. Some LLP provisions use similar
language; however, unlike the ULLCA, the Uniform Limited Liability
Partnership Act (UI.lJ>A) does not provide language relating to liability
136
and formalities.
In addition, there are provisions that do not specifically name the
piercing doctrine or reference factors used in its application, but which
include statements equating the liability shield of members and
shareholders. In states with this type of statute, it is possible to infer that
members should be treated the same as shareholders in situations where
137
the veil piercing doctrine can be applied.
Some of these statutes
combine references to the liability shield with a piercing factor.
California law, for example, states that members will be held liable
"under the same or similar circumstances and to the same extent as a
shareholder of a corporation may be personally liable ... except that the
failure to hold meetings of members or managers or the failure to
observe forrnalities pertaining to the calling or conduct of meetings shall
138
not be considered a factor tending to establish ... liability."
The final category involves statutes that lack any provision
whatsoever related to veil piercing. The majority ofstates' LLE statutes
139
fall into this category.
There are several ways to interpret the lack of
a specific provision relating to veil piercing. The first is to consider the

Butterworth, WESTLA W 1995). The current West Virginia act specifically references the failure to.observe
corporate formalities. S. W.VA. CODE§ 31B-3-303(b) (Matthew Bender, WESTLAW through 2000 1st
Exec. Sess.).
136. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29- I 026{E) (Wesl, WESTLAW through 2000 2d Reg. Sess.
and 5th Spec. Sess.) (Arizona partner liability provision).
137. Schwindt, supra note 32, at 1554.
138. CAL. CORP. CODE§ 1710J(b) (West, WESTLAW through 1999-2000 Reg. Sess~ and 1st Exec.
Sess.). The statutory language relating to corporate foranalities will only apply where the articles of
organization or operating agreement do not expressly require the holding of meetings of members or
managers. S. al.ro WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25. I 5.060 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 2d Spec. Sess.).
139.· Klein, supra note 8, at 134 n.12. Note that there are LLC provisions that include special
provisions relating to the personal liability of professionals or for tax liability. &1, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.§ 23·
18·3-4 (West, WESTLAW through 2001 1st Reg. Sess.) (''[a] person rendering professional services as a
member, a manager, [or] an employee ... is personally liable for the consequences of the person's acts or
omissions to the extent provided by Indiana law or the laws of another state where the person is considered
responsible"); OHIO REV. CODEANN. § J705. 48{0) (West, WESTl.AW through I 24th G .A.) ("This chapter
does not affect any statutory or common law of this or another state that pertains to the relationship between
an individual who renders a professional service and a recipient of that service, including, but not limited to,
any contract or tort liability arising out or acu or omissions committed or omitted during the course of
rendering the professional service!'). For a tax provision, see NEB. REV. STAT.§ 21.2612 (WESTLAW
·through 2000 Reg. Sess.) e'The members of a limited liability company shall be liable in the same manner
as a corporate officer for unpaid taxes imposed upon a limited liability company when management is
reserved to the members.").
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lack of such a provision as a neutral element in determining whether
courts should pierce the veil ofLLEs. Mter al~, the courts developed the
veil piercing doctrine to provide an equitable remedy outside of .the
1
corporation statute. Ml Why should the plain language of the provisions
providing for limited liability for 1rnembers somehow preclude the
141
adoption of this theory for I~I4Es?
Another argument is that courts
could interpret the lack of a statutory provision as an indication that the
legislature has considered the doctri11e and rejected the applicability of
the doctrine to LLEs. The doctrine is widely known to legislatures, as
is illustrated by the number of states that have adopted specific
language. Why should the lack of su(:h a provision not be deemed to be
a statement on the legislature's part? Certainly the rapid passage of
LLE legislation can be seen as an attempt by individual states to provide
more opportunities for limi~ed liability protection.
More LLP provisions are silent on the application of the veil piercing
doctrine than LLC provisions. As most states adopted LLP language
subsequent to LLC language,- it is possible that legislatures are still
considering the impact of cotporate doctrine$ to this type of entity.
Unlike LLC statutes, the adoption of LLP provisions did not require
state legislatures to draft entirely new provisions with the accompanying
consideration of corporate common law theories. It is also possible that
the cotporate attributes of the LLC entity form were deemed to require
attention to this type of detail versus the relatively short amendments to
a state's general partnership act. Certainly the narrower scope of the
limited liability shield in some LLP statutes may be part of the reason
that the application of the piercing doctrine was not considered as an
integral part of the process. Finally, the fact that the ULLPA does not
contain language relating to the doctrine should be considered a possible
reason for the relatively small number ofstates that have dealt with this
issue in their LLP provisions.
.

D. LT.E Ct.rse Law
Unlike the plethora of cases that interpret the. application of piercing
the veil to corporations, there are very few cases that have considered
the issue in the context of an LLC, and to date there is no case in which
142
a court pierced the veil of an I,J4P. In cases that have dealt with the
•

140. Bahls, supra note 8, at 6~ 1.
141. Gelb, supra note 31, at 142. See also Schwindt, IUJira note 32, ~t 1555.
. 142. Much of this is to be expected as the UC has only come into widespread use in the past decade.
A search of the Westlaw database in February 200 I did not find any case that involved the piercing of the
veil ofan LLP.

•
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doctrine as it applied to LLCs, there has been limited discussion of the
factors used to determine whether piercing should occ.ur.
Given the paucity of case law relating to U.S. LLCs, some
commentators have utilized foreign entities with similar structures to
make analogies of what courts may do when faced with the question of
143
piercing these types ofentities. One often-cited case is Gallinger v~ North
144
Star Hospital Mutual Assurance, Ltd., in which the Eighth .Circuit
considered the appropriateness of piercing the veil of an entity that was
established in Bermuda. The Bermudan legislation limited the liability
of each member to the premiums or any unpaid portion thereof due to
the company.••s The Minnesota test that the Gallinger court utilized
required that, in addition to showing undercapitalization or lack of
formalities, a court would have to find that there was an element of
146
injustice or fundamental unfairness to the plaintiff.
The court found
that strict common \aw fraud was not necessary to fulfill the second
element, but it was necessary to present evidence that the entity had
147
been operated as a constructive fraud or in an unjust manner.
The
Gallinger court did not find that this second element was met and instead
pointed to legislation that limited the liability of the members of the
148
entity from the time of its formation.
One commentator analyzin,g
this case argues that the result of Gallinger would have been different had
a corporation been involved and that the decision would have had the
149
effect of raising the bar for piercing LLCs using Minnesota law. This
case is especially interesting given that Minnesota is one o~the states that
includes a provision in its LLC statute providing that this common law
150
doctrine may be applied to LLCs. In a later case ,a pplying Minnesota
law to a Minnesota LLC, a court followed the Minnesota LLC act
provision and applied the Minnesota law on piercing but reversed the
trial court's decision to pierce the veil because the appellate court did
not find any evidence that a member's misleading statements
151
concerning property ownership were intended to mislead the plaintiff.

143. In addition to the Gallinger case discussed in.fra notes 144.148 and accompanying text, see also Abu.Nassa,. v. Elders Fraurts Inc., No. 88 Civ. 7906, 1991 WL 45062 (S. 0 .N.Y. Mar. 28, 1991) (involving a
Lebanese LLC where the court refused to summarily dismiss the piercing claim because there were
outstanding factual issues relating to alter ego, undercapitalization and lack of formalities).
144. 64 F.3d 422 (8th Cir. 1995).
145. ld. at 424.
146. ld. at 427.
147. ld.
14.8. ld. at 428.
149. Klein, supra note 8, at 149.
150. SN MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 322B.303 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 Reg. Sess.).
151. Tom Thumb Food Mkts., Inc. v. TUI Props., LLC, No. C9-98-1277, 1999 WL 31 J68, at *3
(Minn. Ct. App.Jan. 26t 1999). The court also focused on the fact that the party requesting piercing did not
"come ws.
. •th clean hand·s. u '"·
I.J
.

•
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A few courts have applied the doctrine to LLCs without even
considering the defendant's status as an LLC as opposed to a
corporation. In In re Multimedia Communications Group Wireles~ Associate~ of
152
Liher~ Coun~ Georgia, L C., for example, where the defendants included
Nevada and Florida L~Cs as well as corporations formed in Florida and
outside the U.S., the court applied Florida veil piercing law to find that
the entitie~ were. not alter egos of each other, despite facts showing a
common business location, personnel, computer network and a lack of
153
cotporate formalities.
54
In Dit9 v. Checkrite, Ltd., l a Utah federal district court considering
whether to hold an individual member personally liable under a veil
piercing analysis simply stated that ''most commentators .a ssume that the
155
doctrine applies to limited liability companies."
The Dit~ court did
not pierce the veil of the entity and fourid th~t the fact that the
individual played an active role in the business was "only marginally
probative ofthe factors considered when detet·mining whether to pierce
156
A federal district court in Louisiana in Hollowell
the corporate veil.''
v. Orleans Regional Hospital recognized that the lack of state law
requirements relating to formalities, sttch as annual election ofdirectors,
keeping minutes. or holding meetings, would help determine whether
157
veil piercing was appropriate. ·
.

152. 212 B.R. 1006 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
153. /d. at 1010 (requiring
that (I) the shareholder treat the corporation as an alter ego
(2) the
.
.
corporate form is used fraudulently or for an improper purpose and (3) that such use of the corporate fonn
caused injury to the claimant). See also, e.g., Sannerv. Fon McDowell Sand and Gravel, 218 B.R. 941 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 1998) (analyzing piercing the veil of an entity that is described only as a limited liability company,
the coun used corporate tenninology without any discussion of the appropriateness of using the theory on
an LLCJ; Marina, LLC v. Bunon, No. CA 97-1013~ 1998 WL240364(Ark. Ct. App. May 6, 1998)(finding
no error in lhe refusal to pierce the limited liability veil of Marina, LLC, given that the movant was aware
of the status of the financing and that Marina, LLC, was a new endty, with no funher discussion on
applicability of the doctrine to LLCs); New England Nat'l LLC v. Kabro, No. 550014, 2000 WL 254590
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2000) (dete.rmining whether a Connecticut court had personal jurisdiction over
two LLCs organized under New York law and the individual members, th-e-court found sufficient facts to
pierce the .veil of one of the entities and hold personally liable one of the individuals without discussing the
appropriateness of applying the veil piercing theory); Litchfield Asset Mgmt. v. Howell, No. CV980076827,
•s (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, '2000) (referencing the Kabro .case and stating .that
2000 WL 1785122, at
the veil piercing -theory would apply in dte case of a limited liability company and finding that it was
appropriate to "reverse pierce,. to access funds invested in a second LLC by a controlling manager); Leisure
Resort Tech., Inc. v. Trading Cove Assoc., No. CV000091180, 2000 WL 1682535 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct.
13, 2000) (declining to pierce the veil· of a LLC when J>laintiff alleged mere conclusions of law without
addressing status of the entity as a LLC); Vidal, Reynards & Moya. Inc. v. Mountain Springs Co., 248
A.D. 2d 247 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (using a piercing analys1s to reject a request for a trial on the issue without
discussing the applicability of .the doctrine to the LLC).
154. 973 F. Supp~ 1320 (D .. Utah 1997).
155. /d. at 1335 (providing a lengthy list of articles supporting this statement).
156. Jd. at 1336.
157. No. Civ. A. 95-4029, 1998 WL 283298 (E.D. La. May, 29 1998).

•
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The difficulty in interpreting the results of cases dealing with veil
piercing in the context of LLCs is that the treatment of the issue has
been cursoty at best, and in many instances the cases are unreported
and do not have precedential value. Many of the cases have also

involved a federal court's interpretation of state_law.

E.

~ Future

of Veil Piercing

There is disagre_e ment as to whether courts are currendy using the
158

veil piercing doctrine on a more permissive basis. One commentator
expects that more veil iercing litigation can be expected with the
perceived flexible nature of the entity and the interpretation of a
legislature's intent, courts could find that facts that would support
piercing in a cotporate cont~xt may be less persuasive in determining
158. Compat' PRESSER., supra note 42, § 1.06 ("there appears to 'be a much greater willingness to pierce
the veil than there has been for years") wiiA Thompson', supra note 81, at I049·-1050 (finding no trend over
ti'me and that the percentage of cases where couns pierce _the corporate veil has been relatively constant
through the 1960s, 1970s and 1~80s). Federal courts have developed common law regarding the doctrine
or piercing the veil, although these courts looked to state law for guidance so long as state law did not conflict
with federal interests. Recently, couns' application of personal liability under federal statutory schemes has
come under a great deal of scrutiny. St»edalizcd rules relating to piercing the veil are derived directly from
the language or federal statutes that specify enterprise or other status based liability. Stt-generaJ!1 H. Lowell
Brown;. Parenl-Subsidimy Li4bili!J Under 1M Fareign Corrupt Prattitu Aet. 50 BAYLOR L. REV. I (1998).
The language_of federal statutes may specifically impose liability on an entity in a capacity
different than that of ownership. Gcvuttz, supra note 96, at 904. For example~ under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), liability may be imposed on an
"operator,. of a facility. '•Operator,. has been interpreted as the person that controls the activities of the
facility in question. Such_ persons have included parent corporauons. Cons~ce S. Chandler and Rebecca
J. Grosser, An ISJW R;.p,for Suj~T~tM Courl ReuimJ: ~lAir Omgrus lnJentkd lo Alllr 1M Common law Ptineiples Of
Cqrpm-alllimiUd f..iQbilig K'1lm Enacting CERCU, 4 Mo. ENvn. L. & POL'Y REV. 14 (1996) (discussing
whether the standard of liability deriyes from common law principles of corporate law, including veil
piercing, or from a direct application of the statutory definitions_of CERCLA). The_Supreme Court of the
United States addressed the question and deterntined that a parent corporation could be held directly liable
as an "operator" Cor its involvement in the management of a subsidiary facility independent of the ownership
relationship. S. Aron M. Bookman, TrlliUcmding Common Law Ptintipks oflimil«l ~ofParenl Corporalions
/M the Enwonmml, 18 VA. ENvrL. LJ. 555, 556 (1999) (discussing United States v. Bestfoods. 524 U.S. 51
(1998)). Su al.s~ Cynthia Nance, A.ffiliald Corportllion. ~ UNieriM. WARN Ad, 52 Rt.rrGEJtS L. REV. 495,
505 (2000) (" [o] f the fifteen WARN Act cases addressing affiliated corporation liability,_seven use some form
of state veil piercing jurisprudence,.).
·
Federal common law regarding veil pie~ing is as confused as that of individual states. Notably,
there appears to be a trend by some federal couns to allow for veil piercing to occur with greater ease in the
federal context. PRESSER, supra note 42, § 3.01. S« also Presser, supra note 45, at 175. Given that the
theoretical basis for assigning liability is federal statutory language, it appears unlikely that IJ..Es will be able
to avoid the application of the doctrine in the federal context with any g~ater frequency than other types
of entities.
159. Miller, supra note 81, at 86. Professor Miller does not explain why she believes that more
litigation should be expected with LLCs but only highlights that LLCs are able to use the flow through tax
treatment traditionally associated with partnerships. ld.
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160

whether to pierce the veil ofLLEs. Many commentators who believe
that courts are likely to apply the doctrine to LLCs agree that a
mechanical application ofthe same factors used in the corporate context
161
is inappropriate.
Given the relatively few cases in which U.S. courts
have considered piercing an LLC's limited liability veil, it is too early to
make a blanket statement on how courts will handle this issue given the
differences between the LLC and corporate structures. There has been
little discussion of the application of the piercing concept to LLPs.
However, given the similarity of the limited liability protection, it is
likely just a matter of time before an attempt is made to pierce the veil
of an LLP, and the same problems with the application of the doctrine
will be encountered.

162

'

IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE COMMON LAW
VEIL PIERCINCt DOCTRINE

State legislatures in the U.S. have oveiWhelmingly agreed that interest
holders can obtain limited liability protection by utilizing a variety of
entity fortns. Due to the cost to creditors inherent ~n limited liability
systems that protect interest holders, courts have developed limited
liability exceptions such as the veil piercing doctrine. Legislatures
should now consider codifying veil-piercing standards in order to
provide creditors with an equitable remedy and interest holders with
clear guidelines on proper conduct. 1.,here are several alternatives to the
current common law approach to veil piercing that can apply such a
remedy more consistendy. The two primary statutory alternatives
discussed in this paper are the adoption of a statutory provision to codify
veil piercing common law and the utilization of existing fraudulent
transfer provisions. If legislatures want to provide additional protection
for creditors, they may consider other statutory measures, such as
requiring minimum capitalization ()f insurance for all entities with

160. But see Roben B. Thompson, 1'1ll Taming oflimiled LiaiJilig Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 921,
939-40 ( 1995) (stating that the limited liability insulation offered by LLC statutes is unlikely to reach beyond
what is available by using a corporate foan1).
16 1. See, e.g., David L. Cohen, T1uorW ofthe CorporaJion and llu l..imiud Liabilig CAmp~: How Slwuld Courts
and ugislaJures Articulalt Ruks for Piercing 1M Vei4 Fulutimy &sponsibilig and Securilw Regulalitm }Or tJu Limild
Lillhili!J Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 455 ( 1998). ~also Edwin W. Hecker,] r., 1M Kans4f Reuised Limild
Liabili!J Compf119 Act, KAN. BJ., Nov ./Dec. 2000, at 26. Bw see Alting, mpra note 81, at 190 {stating that there
is "no distinction between corporations and LLCs with respect to piercing the veil,).
162. Su Hamilton, supra note 12, at I097 (discussing the application of the veil piercing concepts to
LLPs); Bishop, supra note 110, at 1026 (discussing the likelihood of applying the piercing concept to LLPs
fonned under Massachusetts law).
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limited liability protection or changing the bankruptcy laws to give
163
. .
involuntary creditors superpriority.

A. Statutory Provision
One alternative to the current common law system for veil piercing
is the adoption of a uniform statutory provision articulating the
circumstances under which an interest holder of an entity will lose the
limited liability shield. The parameters of the provision could be drafted
in a variety of ways, but in order for the provision to be useful, it would
need to have specific standards to provide certainty for interest holders,
creditors and the courts. One prop-o sed test, the Matheson/Eby test,
specifies fraud, conflicted exchanges and insolvency distributions as the
circumstances under which the limited liability shield would be removed
164
In order for ~ court to apPly the
as to claims by voluntary cr~ditors.
6
Matheson/Eby test,. an entity must be or become tnsolvent.l Fraud
under the Matheson/Eby testis limite.d to an owner (defined .as anyone
who by reason of an ownership interest is entided to share in the profits
of an entity) who fraudulently misrepresents the assets of the entity in
166
any material aspect. A conflicted exchange under the Matheson/Eby
test is the transfer to an owner (or other organization in which the owner
has a material financial interest) for less than reasonably equivale-n t ·
167
value.
Any distribution to an owner that renders an entity insolvent
is the. final trigger for that owner's losing the limited liability shield
'

under the Matheson/Eby test.

168

The Matheson/Eby test is a good starting point for drafting a
statutory version of veil piercing. ·The_ Matheson/Eby test could be
strengthened by the. addition of provisions similar to those found in the

· 163. The ability of creditors to use these alternatives is impacted by the creditor's status as involuntary
or voluntary. Of course, implementing safeguards to protect individuals; specifically involuntary tort
creditors, is limited only by one's creativity. ~rtainly, changes in the U.S~ system to provide for increased
safety regulations or universal health care would decrease the likelihood of an individual being injured-in the
first place or reduce the economic cost of such injuries to individuals, but these types of solutions are beyond
the scope of this paper. .
164. John H. Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, ~Doetf'iNojPiircingtkl Veil in an.Era oJMuliip"limiud
Liabil~ Entitks: An Opportun#y to Codi;b 1M TutjfJr
Waiving Owners' limdl!d /.i:abiJig. Prot«tion, 75 WASH. L. REV.
.
147, 182 (2000). The proposed test specifically provides that the common law doctrine would be
inapplicable in jurisdictions adopting the model act. ld. at 185.
165. ld. at 184.
166. ld,
167. Id. at 183. Presumably, "reasonably equivalent value" could be interpreted in the same manner
as the phrase has been interpreted in fraudulent transfer cases.
.
168. Jd. An LLE is insolvent when it is "unable to pay its debts in the ordinary course of business.,
/d.
·'

'
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Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (<liscussed below). Specifically, any
proposed test should, as much as U!asible, include definitions for the
application of concepts such as ''value, and "transfer." Such an act also
would need to include time limits for bringing an action under any
statutory provision and specifically articulate judicial remedies.
One of the challenges for any statutory provision covering veil
piercing is to allow interest holders who act inappropriately to waive
limited liability without unduly restricting the ability of parties to
allocate business risks. Commentators focused on the externalities
generated by the limited liability system probably would not accept a
statute ·unless it ensured that tort creditors had some basis for utilizing
169
the statute in cases of fraud.
•

B. Fraudulent 'l,.ransfer Laws

•

Creditors who are unable to utilize the veil piercing doctrine may still
be able to collect from interest holciers who behave in a fraudulent
170
manner through the application offraudulent transfer laws.
Most
171
states have adopted a statutory fraud·ulent transfer act. Although no
one provision has been universally adopted, the two mo.st common types
of provisions are based on the U11ifonn Fraudulent Transfer Act
172
(UITA) and the older Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA).
As the majority of states have adopted the UFTA, the focus in this
173
section will be on the UFTA's provisions.
·
·
•

169. Matheson and Eby recognize that their model act as currently stated will not cover the claims
of tort claimants or .claims. based on statutory liabilities, as. the act's application is restricted to voluntary
creditors. The apparent basis for such a restriction is Jhat these involuntary claimants do not place any
reliance on the apparent validity of transfers or assets of me business. ld. at 186. In order to provide some
protection for involuntary creditors, the Matheson/Eby test's provisions waiving limited liability for
conflicted exchanges and insolvency distributions could be applied regardless of the status of the creditor.
170. Clark, supra note 82,.-al 542~ This al'ticle, among other issues, discusses the interrelation between
fraudulent conveyance and piercing the corporate veil. As discussed below, one of the major barriers to the
use of a fraudulent transfer act is that it will be necessary for the creditor to show that there was a transfer.
There may be an indefinite number of unfair transactions and it may be difficult or costly to prove that there
was a lack of fair consideration for such transfers. It!. at 543. As with veil piercing, the application of
fraudulent transfer law achieves justice between unsecured creditors and debtors. Se~ gmera/9 Marie-T.
Reilly, The lAtml .E.ffoim,f.y of Fraudulenl Transfer l.mo, 57 LA. L. REV. J213 (discussing the fact that the
'
predominant view or commenqttors justifying fraudulent transfer law has a strong moralistic flavor).
17 I. Jeffrey L. LaBine, Mu:n.ipn.'s Adoption of the llnifrmn Fraudulml Tt:ansfer AeL· An Examir,tation tif lhe.
CJumges Effected 16 I& Stall ofFratU!ulenl Conveyanu lmn,. 45 \VAYNE L. REV. 1479, 1488 ( J999). The Uniform
~"raudulent Transfer Act has been adopted by thirty-eight jurisdictions. ld. Non·UFTAjurisdictions have
adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act or continue to depend on common law. ld.
172. ld. at 14.8.1 ~ These uniform acts were developed by the NCCUSL to respond to ambiguities in
fraudulent conveyance law. The UFTA was developed to address issues that arose in the application ofthe
UFCA. 0ld. at 1487-88.
173. The UFTA preserved the essential approach a.nd structure of the UFCA, however there are new

•

,.

126

UNIVERS!TrOFCINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vot 70

The UFTA provides creditors with a series of remedies when an
entity has fraudulendy transferred assets . . The key to the application of
the UITA is determining whether a transfer is fraudulent. Transactions
in which an entity transferred funds with the intent to hinder, delay or
defraud creditors illustrate the most straightforward application of the
174
UFTA.
In addition, the UFTA includes "constructive fraud"
175
provisions to deal with the challenge of proving intent to defraud,
176
such as the use of a "balance sheet test" to determine insolvency. If
a debtor does not receive· reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
incurring an obligation or making a transfer while the debtor is
77
The
insolvent, the creditor can avoid or set aside such transfer.•
successful application of these constructive. fraud provisions of the
UFTA allows a remedy for creditors regardless of a debtor's intent.
As to transfers to insiders, the UFTA provides that a creditor can set
aside any transfer to an insider who has reasonable cause to believe that
a debtor is insolvent where the transfer is payment for an antecedent
178
debt occurring when the debtor is actually insolvent. A creditor must
prove that an insider had reasonable cause to believe that a debtor is
179
insolvent in order to utilize this section of the UFTA.
Remedies available to discourage such transfers include the entry of
judgment for the value of the assets or the extent of the creditors claim,

sections in the UFTA that specifically address which transfers and obligations are fraudulent. The UFTA
incorporates many concepts of the Bankruptcy Code, including definitions of insider and insolvency. Su id.
at 1487-88.

•

•

174, Barry L. Zaretsky; FraudulenJ Transfer law as lluA.r/JillrofUnreo.sotUJb/4 Riskt 46 S.C. L. REV. 1165,
1166(1995). These would be t~sactions_ in which the primary intent is to put _assets bey_ond or hide assets
from creditors. Jd.
175. JtL at 1166. Constructive fraud provisions fall within a few models. The first model states that
even if intent to defraud cannot be. shown, it can be implied by transactions where debtors do not receive
reasonably equivalent value or were financially impaired at the time of or due to th~ transaction. /d. at 1172.
The second model is based on the Idea that ·~ustice'' towards creditors comes before generosity~ thus some
transactions are improper towards creditors. ~. iJ. at 1173. In the third model, certain transactions are
viewed as having the effect of unreasonably increasing the risk faced by creditors and interfering with a
creditor's ability to -collect on its claims. ld. at II 73-74.
176. If a creditor cannot show intent to defraud, the only transfers to outsiders covered by the UFTA
are those for less than reasonably equivalent value taken when a debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the_remaining
assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation· to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he [or .she] would
incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability to pay as they became due.
UNIF. FRAUDULENTTRANSFERACT§ 4, 7A U~L.A. 301 (1999).
177. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Act §§ 2, 3, 7, 7A U.L.A. 28.9, 295, 339 (1999).
178. "Insider" is broadly defined in the UFTA to in-clude familial relationships as weU as those based
on control of entities. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Ac:r §§ I(7), 4, 7A U.-L.A. 275, 30 I (J999).
179. The UFTA's burden or proof, of proving reasonable cause to believe that a debtor is insolvent,
may be easier for creditors to prove than the actual fraud required by some courts that apply the veil piercing
doctrine. ~ UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT§ 4, 7A U .L.A. '30 1 ( 1'999).
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injunctive relief against further disposition by the debtor and/ or transferor, and a: provision that allows "any other relief the circumstances·
180
may require.,
Although there are time limits in the UFTA that
require creditors to act promptly, pr<>visions in the act allow creditors to

begin ,a proceeding based on the 'U FTA prior to a time that a claim has
181
been litigated and reduced to final judgment. In addition, the UFTA
recognizes and remains flexible in the incorporation of equitable
principles to reflect individual situations that arise under the act. By
retaining equity as a p~rt ofthe application ofthe UITA, judges will still
have discretion to avoid a transfer if the facts warrant such a remedy.
As discussed above, the fraudulent actions of an interest holder are at
182
the heart of the veil piercing doctrine.
By using fraudulent transfer
provisions to combat actual and co11structive fraud, courts are able to
accomplish the goal ofveil piercing- fairness by limiting a debtor's
183
ability to shift risk to a creditor. Risk allocation between creditors and
debtors is at the center of the debate relating to limited liability. An
interest holder's ability to externalize risk through the application of a
limited liability shield is destroyed through the application of the veil
piercing theory. In the same manner, an interest holder's ability to
externalize risk by increasing the level of risk to creditors through
transactions that interfere with a cre<iitor's ability to collect on its claims
184
is one way to view fraudulent conveyance law. Ofcourse, by avoiding
185
a transfer, the subsequent transferee m~y have to absorb the loss.
.

180. UNIF. FRAUDULENTTRANSFERACT § 7(aX3)(iii), 7A U .L.A. 339 (1999). Other possible remedies
include the "appointment of a receiver to take charge of the assel transferred or of other property of the
transferee,., or a coun "may levy execution on the asset transferred -o r its proceeds, ifa creditor has obtained
a judgment on a claim against the debtor. UNJF. FllAUttULENTTRANSFERACT §§ 7(a)(3)(ii), 7(b), 7A U.L.A.

•

339·40 ( 1999).
181. A claim will be extinguished under the UIT.A ifit is not made within (I) four years after a transfer

is made if there was actual intent (or within one yea·r after the transactiQn could have reasonably been
discovered); (2) four years for other transfers if constructive fraud is involved; or (3) one year after a transfer
is made if the transfer is made to an insider for an antecedent debt. UNJF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
§9, 7AU .L.A. 359 ( 1999). -Holders of unliquidated tort claims or contingent claims may be creditors under
the UFTA. UNIF. FRAUDULENTTRANSFERACT§§ 1{3), (4), 7A U.L.A. 275,301 (1999). S~ction 4(a)ofthe
UITA states that a creditor'' claim may arise "before •>r after the transfer was made or the .obligation was
incurred." UNIF.FAAUDUI£NTTRANSFERAcr § 1-, 7A U.L.A. 301 (1999).
182. See supra_note 102 el SIIJ. and accompanying text (discussing fraud as a factor in veil piercing). As
Professor Clark states, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil may be seen as an application "of the same
notions of securing the moral obligations of debtors to creditors'which are at work in fraudulent conveyance
law.u Clark, supra note 82, at 505.
183. Frederick Tung, Limiled l.i.abili!1 and Crtdilms' Righls: 1M Limits ofRisk Shifting lo Creditu.rs, 34 GA.
L. REV. 54 7t 566 (2000).
184. Zaretsky~ supra note 174, at 1166-67.
185. Section 8 of the UITA sets ()Ut the defenses, liability and protection of transferees and specifically
allows for a good faith transferee to have certain protections in the assets transferred. UNIF. FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT§ 8, 7A U .L.A. 35 l.

•

128

UNIVERSITrOFCINCINNATIIAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

Unless the transfer is to an insider, the loss is merely shifted from one
186
creditor to another.
It is important to note that a transfer will be
avoided only if it was made for less than reasonably equivalent value.
A later-in-time creditor who takes an asset for less than reasonably
equivalent value could be· viewed as assuming the risk of having a
187
transfer undone.
Depending on your perspective, the allocation of
loss to transferees may be too narrow or too broad due to certain
.protections that transferees have under the UITA.
Fraudulent conveyance law has a narrower scope than veil piercing.
There must be a transfer of som~ type, and a creditor must obtain
knowledge of such transfer in a timely manner. It can be difficult to
determine whether "reasonably equivalent value" has been provided,
188
especially in situations where there are multiparty transactions. If a
transfer is made while the entity is solvent, a creditor will have the same
difficulties of proving actual fraudulent intent as under a veil piercing
claim.
The advantage of utilizing fraudulent conveyance law over the veil
piercing common law is the relative uniformity offraudulent conveyance
law and the articulation of specific standards in such laws. The defined
terms' incorporated in the VITA provide interest holders with a set of
standards to utilize to determine whether a creditor could successfully
challenge a particular transfer. Although certain interest holders may
still decide to make a transfer, the possible repercussions to the parties
of such a transfer are known, with the remedies set forth in the statute.
Having a statutory provision to intetpret provides the judicial branch
with the tools it needs to consistently provide remedies to creditors.
Although there are many criticisms of fraudulent conveyance l~w, such
laws at least attempt to provide a framework for the judicial process

186. Even given this imperfect loss shifting, using fraudulent conveyance law can at least shift loss from
involuntary to voluntary creditors. S. iJ.
187. Jd. § 8(a). Section 8(a) states thai a transfer that was made with actual intent is not voidable
"against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value or against any subsequent
transferee or obligee." Jd. Due to this saving language, subsequent transferees will be shielded from the
applicalion of the avoidance remedy. ~ id.
188. Allenj. Littman, Mullipu fnlmt, Vtii·Piercing, and Burdens and &nefiLr: Fraudulml Conveyance fmo and
Mullipar~ TranstJCtimu, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 307,312 (1985). An example of such a multiparty problem is
a guarantee by a subsidiary for a debt of a sister company where a security interest secures the guaranty.
Courts have adopted several doctrines to assist in applying the concept of reasonably equivalent value,
including one doctrine that relates to the "identity of interests" of the parties - essentially one aspect of the
veil piercing doctrine. /d. at 339. For a further discussion on analyzing risk of guaranty liability, see
Zaretsky, supra note 174, at 1192-99. For an extensive discussion on applying fraudulent transfer law to
intercorporate guarantees, seejack F. Williams, TJ&e Falla&iesl![Ctmimapormy FraudulenJ Transfer Motkls as Applied
IQ lnlercorpotalt Guaranties.· Fraudulml Transfer low as a ~9 ~slem, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1403 ( 1994).
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rather than require judges to rely on the tangled web of decisions that
189
constitute the common law on veil piercing.
C. Minimum Capital Requirements/Insurance
.
One theory that historically was used to attempt to guarantee that
funds were available to creditors is the imposition of minimum capital
190
requirements on entities_with limited liability protection. The idea of
. requiring "adequate'' capital in exchange for the right to do business
191
remains a part of current corporate law for specified industries. An
argument can be made that the barriers these requirements create for
new entities seeking to enter the market will be offset by the efficiencies
192

to so,ciety as a whole by the protection that the requirements provide.
If the goal is to provide for a greater amount of assets to be available to
creditors,· it is necessary to consider minimum capital requirements in
connection with mandatory insurartce~ Even if regulators decide that
insurance is not required to cover all possible losses, the requirement of
mandatory insurance could reduce some of the. risk that involuntary
193
creditors would be required to assume under the current syste-m.
'

•

189. One argument that fraudulent transfer law alone does not adequately protect creditors is based
on the proof difficulties inherent in such laws. Tung, supra note 183, at 568.
190. Most states currently do not require minimum capital requirements for corporations. Hamilton,_
supra note 12, at 1076. As discussed above, undercapitalization has been used as a factor to support •veil
piercing. &4 supra notes 112·117 and accompanying text.
,
.
191. Capital adequacy _guidelines are used in connection with the supervision of banks. James B.
Ransom, "Cap.ilal .Adequa&y" in Ctiris: Towards an Oplitmal Bank Deposillnsuranc' Regiml, i S. CAL. INTERDISC.
LJ. 445, 451 ( 1998). See also genetaJ!y John C. Deal et al., Cof;ilal Punislzmml: TM D«JJh of Limiled li.abil~ frw
SkatJwltkrsuJFedero.Jg JaguliJJ4d Financiallnstilutiqns, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 67 (1995). This article includes a brief
review of the history of capital requirements for federally regulated financial institutions, beginning with the
minimum capital requirements required by the National Bank Act in 1864. I d. at 70. See a/sQ generally Heath
Price Tarbert, Are ll .
. CapiJalAtlequaty Rulu Atkquall?. 1M &su Acctw.d and BeyqruJ, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1771 (2000) (discussing_the international accord (the Basle Accord) outlining global capital adequacy
standards). The current capital adequacy guidelines for banks have been subject to a great deal of criticism.
ld.; i.u o.lso gmero.J!1 Walter I. Conroy, Risk-Based CapiJal AUquaty Gui.tklines: A Sound &gulatory Poli9 or A
Symptom ofRegu/4Jory lnadequtuy?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395 (1995).
Another example is_that certain financial requirements are applied to owners and operators of
waste- management facilities. John H. Turner, The U.S. EPA 40 C.F.R~ Part 258 Fintw:ial Test/Corporau

Guaranta -New Envirtmmtn/419' Prot«tive, Cost;..Efft&tiw Nltchtmirnasfor 1M Demtmstralitm l!fFuumcial ResponJibili!Y.,
9 FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 567 ( 1998)~ This article includes a description of the mechanisms indorsed by the

Environmental Protection Agency that can be used to demonstrate financial responsibility, including surety
bonds, insurance or a corporate fina-ocial test. /d. at 588.
192. But sN Matheson 8t Eby, supra note Hi4, at 177 (arguing that minimum capitalization
requirements .are not supported in a discussion on·the undercapitalization factor in veil piercing).
193. Coffey, supra not,e 70, at 90. Essentially, assuming bankruptcy
of the entity,
.
. the only way that a_
tort victim-can be reimbursed under the-current system is through the relatively low priority that such an
unsecurt:d creditor is given under the bankruptcy system. By providing for some insurance coverage, the
tort victim may be able to rtcoup at least some of its losses.
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The requirement of mandatory liability insurance for entities is an
idea that has been explored in connection with proposals to eliminate
194
limited liability. Unlimited liability can be viewed as a method under
195
which interest holders provide insurance to creditors of an entity.
Minimum insurance requirements still exist under some state laws. For
example, several states require entities to maintain a specified level of
196
insurance or security in order to maintain status as an LLP.
Although insurance requirements are more common for entities
rendering certain professional services, the concept could be applied
97
across industries} The insurance market for liability coverage has
matured considerably since the beginning of widespread provision of
limited liability protection for shareholders, and liability insurance is
198
available for most businesses.
One advantage of insurance over minimum capital requirements is
that minimum insurance levels would be set to cover expected losses
thus leaving to interest holders decisions relating to the appropriate
199
capitalization level and mix of the entity.
Provisions for insurance
alternatives, such as segregated funds or minimum net worth
requirements, would continue to give entities some flexibility in
200
allocating their resources.
An initial difficulty with minimum capital requirements or insurance
201
coverage is the inflexibility of the standards.
Given the wide variety
of possible tort losses across industries and geography (or even
differences in the average amount of voluntary debt held by entities), it
would be extremely difficult for regulators to set standards that provide
an optimal amount of protection for creditors without damping the

•

194. See Hansmann & K raakman, supra note 70, at 1927. See tdro.TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. X,
§ 6132b-3.08 (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Reg. Sess.) (requiring that I.I.Ps maintain S I00,000 in funds
that is segregated for the purposes of satisfying judgments against the partnership or carry at least SJ00,000
in liability insurance). Many entities already carry insurance. An explanation for a corporation's incentive
to insure is found in Easterbrook&. Fischel, supra note 48, at 52. Sa also Louis De. Alessi, ~ Carporalions
Insure, 25 ECON. INQUIRY 429 (1987) (analyzing why corporations insure).
195. Thompson, supra note 4, at 21. Using this premise, the value of the ownership interests in an
entity would be reduced to reflect the fact that the interest holders are essentially issuing insurance to tort
creditors. ld.
196. &-supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
197. ~ t.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.05.125 {West, WESTLAW through 2000 Second Spec.
Sess.) (designating insurance requirements for partners in I .I..Ps that are required to be licensed to perform
professional services).
198. Hansmann &. Kraakman, supra note 70, at 1888; 1926.
199. · Coffey, supra note 70, at 90.
200. Su supra text accompanying note 27 (discussing the alternatives to insurance requirements).
20 I~ Hansmann &. Kraakman, supra note 70, at 1927. An example of the failure to detennine a
workable regulatory capital standard is the experience of the banking agencies' failure to standardize a
measure linking a bank's capital adequacy to its level of interest rate risk. Ransom, supra note 191, at 445.
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ability of parties to enter an industry and successfully become an
202
efficient frrn1.
The application of insurance coverage and capital ·
requirements for entities with involvement in more than a single type of .
industry may also seJVe to make th(!Se types of provisions so complex
that the inefficiencies could overcome the benefit ofproviding resources
for creditors. The process of determining the amount of insurance
coverage would require regulators to make assumptions about the
average risk that firn1s in particular i1ndustries are willing to take. Some
firms certainly would be over- or ·under-insured if a regulator made
these types of detenninations. Given the ·non-standard language of
policy exclusions, regulators would also need to set out minimal
203
standards for the coverage of the policies.
In addition to the difficulties of determining appropriate levels of
capitalization or insurance, another issue that would need to be resolved
is what should happen if an entity fails to maintain capitalization or
204
insurance at the minimum statutory level. Rational arguments can be
made that the failure to meet any suc:h level Should totally eliminate the
limited liability protection of the entity. Equally credible arguments can
be made that the impact of such a failure should be that interest holders
are personally liable only ug to the amount of minimal capitalization or ·
05
insurance that is required.
.
In order to encourage compliance with capitalization requirements
or mandatory insurance coverage, f,ersonalliability could be imposed
on management employees or controllin~ interest holders ofentities that
20
do not comply with the statutory no11m. The difficulty would lie in the
borderline cases·- how much "contrc>l" does a member ofan entity need
to have before being deemed to be part of this group? Would
restrictions on the type of decisions that a member has the right to vote
on be considered when determining this control? One alternative is to
require at least one individual to be named as potentially personally
•

202. Hansmann 8t Kraakman, Stipra note 70, at J927. In the bankruptcy context, courts have defined
unreasonably small capi~ in several ways. Garrick A~ Hollander, Defining t•Unrea.ronab!Y Small Capilal" in
Frmululem Conveyanu Cases" Ralio Anaf1sis Mtg Plouidl an An.swn, 49 Bus. LAw. I 185, 1197 (1994). Various
ways to define capital include insolvency analysis, cash flow analysis, working capital analysis and a variety ·
of other factors relating to a business' ability to survive. ld.
203. Thompson, supra note 4, at 21 (pointing out that there has been extensive litigation over the
interpretation of insurance policy provisions that exclude environmental claims).
204. This assumes that the statutory scheme requires an entity to maintain a set level at all times.
205. By lifting the limited liability veil in its entirety, an argument can be made that creditors are being
overcompensated. Clark, supra note 82, at 547, 548.
206. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 70, at 1927. Professon Hansmann and Kraakman
specifically discuss corporate officers and directors but of course when dealing with the various types oflJ.Es
it would be necessary to craft any such statute to include the various types of parties that are involved in all
of the available entities.
'
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liable for breaches of these statutory limits, but of course such a system
could cause entities to select an individual that is most judgment-proof
to act in such capacity. Violation of these statutory norms could also be
a trigger for the eliminati<>:n of limited liability protection for ,all the
interest holders of an entity. Such a provision would certainly
encourage interest holders to ~onfirm that the entity in which they
invested is in compliance with the statute. One problem with such a
serious consequence for a perhaps minor breach (for example, the
insuranc-e coverage is just below the statutory requirement) is that the
benefits oflimited liability, specifically the reduction in monitoring costs,

would likely be seriously irnpa,.cted.
•

D. Superpriori!J in Banlaup9 for Tort Claims
.

Piercing the veil is obviously not necessary if the entity has sufficient
assets to meet its obligations. Generally, the doctrine is applied in
situations where the entity is insolvent and may have already filed for
207
bankruptcy protection.
Although uninsured tort claims do not
208
frequently arise in bankruptcy, such claims can be substantial. The
·u·.S. Bankruptcy Code sets forth priorities that determine the order
in
209
which creditors have access to th~ assets of an insolvent entity. The
Bankruptcy Code gives certain unsecured priority claims (including
some wages, contributions to employee benefit plans and tax liabilities)
210
and secured claims priority over unsecured claims.
There is active
debate as to the efficiency of the bankruptcy priority system as well as
211
the impact that the bankruptcy law has on risk taking.- One issue

. 207. Elizabeth E. Brown,_.A Guide to WanningAIIer Ego Claims, AM. BANKR. INST.j. 15, 16 Oune 1996)
(discussing uses of th~ piercing doctrine in the bankruptcy setting); Jeremy V. Richards, Alter Ego Claims of
1M Debtor Vest Excl.usiw!Y in 1114 &taU, 23 CAL BANKR.J. 15 (1996) (discussing cir~uit court decisions on the
issue of whether the trustee can pursue veil piercing claims).
208. Lucian Arye Beb¢huk &Jesse .M. Fried, 1M UnefL!1 CaslJIW Ike Priorig ofStcurtd Claims in BanbuplfY:
FurtMr Tlwugllts and a Rep!J to CtilU:s, 82 CORNEU.. L. REV. 1279, 1297 ( 1997).
209. Su II U .S.C.A. § 507 (West, WESTLAW through P.L. I07·II, approved 5-28-200 I).
210. II U .S.C.A. § 506 (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-26,-approved 8... 17..Q I). Secured claims
take priority only to the extent that the claim is secured by specified collateral. /d. § 506(a). If a claim is only
partially secured by collateral, the claim is deemed to have priority only to the extent of the secured amount
of the debt /d.

211. Steven L. Schwarcz, 71u ,Easy Cos•ftW lhl Priorig f!!Secuttd Claims in Banhupky, 47 DUKE LJ. 425
(1997) (arguing that there are advantages to unsecured debtors supporting the-priority of secured claims};
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 208 (following up on an earlier article discussing, among other issues, the
economic costs that arise from providing full priority to secured claims in bankruptcy). This article also
contains :a footnote with an extensive listing of writings relating to the issue of efficiency benefits of the
priority rules.ld. at 1381 n.5. S.Ludan Arye Bebchuck &Jesse M. Fried, T1u Uruasy Casefor 1M Priorig of
Secured Claims in Banhupllzl,_105 YALE LJ. 857 (1996) (offering two rules ofpartial priority to be considered
as alternatives to the rules of full priority). For a technical discussion of the impact of bankruptcy law on
•

•

•
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related to this topic is the ability of an entity to grant a security interest
to a creditor (who thus increases its security for a debt or becomes .
212
secure) to the detriment ofinvolunta.ry creditors.
Given that voluntary creditors have the ability to allocate risk through
their investigation of debtors and can require security for their risk,
legislatures could provide certain involuntary creditors with additional
protection: by giving tort victims superpriority U·nder the bankruptcy
213
laws. Allowing superpriority of tort creditors does not in and of itself
increase the amount of assets available for all creditors but merely
214

~

reallocates this risk.
Some commentators who argue that the
bankruptcy system should be changed focus on the ability of voluntary
creditors to diversify their losses and the relative efficiency of voluntary
215
creditors as monitors of tort risks. ~fhere are arguments that it will be
inefficient, and perhaps for smaller creditors impracticable, for creditors
to take on this monitoring role; however, it see_ms to be a n:a tural
extension of the activities of creditors who investigate the management
216
of entities ~th which they conduct business.
In fact, the current
priority system reduces the incentive ofa secured creditor to monitor the
debtor and attempt to enforce cove.n ants relating to risk that are
217
included in loan documents.
One of the many p_otential problems
with this idea is that cre-ditors .may set forth such stringent restrictions on
a management's ability to take risks that an entity's abilitY. to develop is
stifled. Certainly, a secured creditor that loses its priority in bankruptcy
218
is likely to charge a higher rate for it'> increased risk.
A less dramatic change to the ba:nkruptcy code would be to allow
21
involuntary creditors priority over unsecured voluntary creditors. ~

invcscrnent in an entity, see Daniel E. Ingberrnan, Triggns and Prioti9: An lnJegrattd Modll of the Effects of
· Banlauptcy Law on Overinvestnll1lt and Untlerinveslment, 73 WASH. U. L.Q 1341 (1994).
2 J2. Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 208, at 1297. Presumably if a security interest is granted under
fraudulent circumstances,. the transaction would fall within the purview of the fraudulent transfer provisions
and could be avoided. Su supra notes 170·88_and accompanying text (discussing the role. of fraudulent
conveyanc:e law).
· · and Other
213. Leebron, supra note 67, at 1643. Su alro gnuralfy Andrew Price, Tort CreditorS
Proposed Solutions w Corpora14 Limiled l..iahiJig and lhe Problem of &tmuJlilits, 2 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 439
(1995).
214. Price, supra note 213, at 468.
215. Leebron, supra note 67 ,_at 1643. The losses of any creditor would be limited to the amount of
the loan. In addition, a superpriority rule would, in <:onnection with tort risks, restore capital structure
neutrality.

216. See also Price, supra note 213, at 476 (discussing increased monitoring :costs for firms).
217. Bebchuk& Fried, supra note 208, at 1315.
218. Price, supra note 213, at 464.
219. Coffey, SJJ!wa note 70, at 87. This altemativf: raises the difficulty of detem1ining which creditors
are voluntary. An example of a gray area is if there are wo.rkplace or product liability injuries where the
creditor had a pre-existing voluntary relationship with the entity. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 70,_

•
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Other options are to allow fo:r partial priority of secured creditors or
221
to set aside a portion of a debtor'·s collateral for unsecured creditors.
Any change to allow for priority for involuntary tort creditors will need
to take into account the relative efficiencies of secured debt~ A higher
cost for financing could m~an that entities have fewer liquid assets
222
available for distribution to all creditors.
·

V. RECOMMENOATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The result ofthe introduction ofnew limited liability entity forms and
the subsequent amendment of rules relating to them is that there are no
real differences among entities in regard to the liability protection
223
available to their interest holders.
The universality of the liability
protection among all the entities means that all interest holders, whether
partners, members or shareholders, can be treated the same with resp-e ct
224
to the exceptional situations that warrant the loss of limited liability.
Rather than apply the flawed veil piercing doctrine to these new entities

•

at 1920. One way to resolve this issue is to consider whether the victim could_have reasonably understood
to have "contracted with the fir1n in substantial awareness of the risks of injury involved." Jd. at 1921.
Clearly, some voluntary creditors, such as employees and small suppliers, will have fewer methods to ensure
their protection than financial crcditon. Tung, supra note 183, at 555. Consumer creditors also are difficull
to protect. Although consumers generally have the ability tQ choose who they deal with, they generally can
not determine the financial status of the entity tha~ may uhima~ely be liable for' their contract claims.
220. Bebchuk &. Fried, svJ1ra note 208, at 1328 (discussing the cost and availability of financing under
partial priority).
221. Schwarcz, supra note 211, at 427. q. .Gary E. Claar, 1M CaseJtW a Bttnlaup.ky Cotk ~for
C~«mup Claims, 18 WM. MITCHEJ.LL. REV. 29 ( 1992) (arguing that a predictable level of priority
for cleanup claims would serve the interests of creditors as well as enforcers of environmental liability).
222. The additional cost of the financing would decrease the availability of assets for other investment
opponunides both within and outaide-of the entity.
223. For an argument that it is time to scrap the multitude ofaltemate forms of business organizations
for a "limited entity.. statute for small business, see Dale A. Oesterle&. Wayne M. Gazur, ~~in aName?:
An Argumtn~fM a Small Bu.ritws "LimiteJ litJbi~i!1 Enlig" SIIJJull (U"alla 11nw Subsets ofDefaull Rriw), 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 101 (1997). An alternative proposed by Professor Ribstein is statutory authorization for
"'Contractual Entities" in which owner liability as well as other terrns would be gov~med solely by such
entity's filed operating agreement. Larfl: E. Jtibstein, limiled /.iJJJJiJig Unlimiletl, 24 DEL.J. CORP. L. 407
(1999). &, also William A~ Klein&. Eric M. Zolt,llwinus Form, limiltlllinbility, and Tax Reginw: lmching
Toward a Cohemtl Ouko1111, 66 U. COLO. L. R.EV. I00 I, 1041 ( 1995) (proposing that lawmakers stan from
scratch to create a set of state laws for business associations based on limited liability and tax regimes). Note
that the Klein and Zolt article was published prior to the adoption of the "check-the-box, niles that allow
for the election by any non-corporate entity 9f partnership_or corporate tax treatment.
224. In fact, the commcn&ary that ·supports the application of the veil piercing theory to LLCs supports
this proposition. S, supra notes 159-61. ctf. Kl~in & Zolt, supra note 223, at 1036. After an examination of
the various argumenta relating tQ limited liability, K'ein and Zolt stated that "the most important proposition
that emerges [from such discu~ion] ._.. is chat none Juggestthat deciding whether to grant limited liability
should turn on the choice of business (orm.•• ld. Just as granting limited liability no longer turns on the
choice of business form, it does not make sense that ·the application of a theory that eliminates this attribute
should tum on the same choice. ·
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and continue to apply the theory to corporations, legislatures should
consider the underlying policy isst1es supporting . veil piercing and
implement solutions that d.irecdy address those co·ncerns. Legislatures
have demonstrated their willingness to break with established rules
relating to corporations and partnerships and reshape the environment
225
in which entities do business. The adoption of a statutory provision
to codify veil piercing and the increased use of existing statutory
language relating to fraudulent transfers, along with other statutory
reforms, can address the underlying J~olicy concerns relating to limited
liability and provide courts with a stnacture that allows for the provision
of a remedy in a more consistent manner.

•

225. For an example of the pletho~ of entity forms available to practitioners. see William H. Clark,
What the Bwitws World is Loo/cingfM in an Orgonicalitmal Ftnrn: 7'111 ~bJaniiJ Experience, 32 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 149 (1997).
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